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ABSTRACT 
Health capital in Russia is in steep decline.  Today the Russian population is 
decreasing by more than 700,000 per annum.  Life expectancy has decreased significantly 
since it peaked in the mid-1960s.  Infectious diseases, including an emerging HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, are threatening to worsen Russia’s health crisis and further overwhelm a 
dilapidated healthcare system.  Soviet and Russian government policies aimed at 
preserving health capital have failed consistently.  Government policies and intervention 
have contributed to the crisis.  The purpose of this research was to determine a possible 
explanation for the continuity in ineffective government policy.  The analysis indicates 
the influence of a paternalistic political culture permeates the political process.  As a 
result, the government is free to pursue its own agenda without a significant degree of 
accountability to the population.  Issues affecting health capital are not a priority of the 
government.  The consequence, therefore, is short-sighted and uncoordinated government 
policy and programs that are under-funded.  Long-term improvements to Russia’s health 
capital will require a shift in the political culture.  State-society relations must evolve to 
allow and encourage greater interaction between state officials and the general 
population.  Without government accountability or individual responsibility, health 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the decline in health capital in the 
Russian Federation through the prism of continuity of government policy.  While health 
capital is an important human rights issue, this research will approach the concept as 
essential element in economic performance.  Since at least the late 1970s, health capital 
in Russia has been in decline as indicated by demographic and health measurements.  
Despite recognition of a worsening and evolving health crisis, the Soviet government 
effectively ignored the issue by covering up unflattering statistics, while attempting to 
reinforce an existing system which was no longer capable of fulfilling its primary role.2  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, healthcare was legally reformed in an attempt 
to deal with the crisis efficiently.  The reforms, however, have met only limited success 
and the current healthcare system is still incapable of dealing with the scope of health 
challenges facing Russian society.3  Additionally, while President Vladimir Putin and his 
administration have recognized the deepening health and demographic crisis openly, 
government policy largely has proven incapable of enacting meaningful and positive 
change. 
This thesis explores a number of factors which influence the formation and 
implementation of Russian domestic policy as it affects health capital.  The overarching 
goal is to determine why government policy in the Russian Federation has proven 
consistently ineffective in dealing with issues affecting the health of the population.  
Further, by determining what factors obstruct the formation of effective health policy, 
this research aims to present reasonable policy alternatives which potentially will 
overcome past obstacles while simultaneously improving the national stock of health 
capital. 
A. JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH 
Following the collapse of the ruble in 1998, the Russian economy has made a 
remarkable recovery.  High energy prices have driven up Russia’s GDP since 1999 and 
                                                 
2 Ellie Tragakes and Suszy Lessof, Health Care Systems in Transition: Russian Federation, 2003 
(Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2003): 8-9 and 24. 
3 Ibid., 169-93. 
2 
filled the government’s coffers.  The results, on the surface, indicate a significant level of 
economic modernization and development.  Russia has been able to pay off much of its 
international debt, pay pensions and wages, and reinvest in the economy.  Additionally, 
living standards have risen and a sense of stability, long missing, has returned.4    With its 
immense geographic size and location, its massive nuclear arsenal, and a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council, Russia can now reclaim international acknowledgement as a 
global economic force.5  Russia’s recent strong economic performance has lent credence 
to President Vladimir Putin’s goal of achieving recognition as “a normal great power.” 6  
After nearly a decade of being pushed aside, what Russia says and does matters again. 
Beneath the veneer of success, however, Russia’s economic sustainability remains 
at risk.  While the energy sector and a few other portions of the Russian economy have 
fared well over the past few years, overall the economy remains “precariously dependent 
on exports of oil, gas, and other raw material.”7  Government revenues, heavily 
dependent on energy exports, are subject to vulnerabilities which cannot be offset without 
a diversified economic base.  As the government and investors have focused on the 
energy market, however, other industries have suffered.  Non-energy sectors of the 
market have seen little investment.  Energy revenues have “subsidized the old economic 
system and enabled it to coast along.”8  While recent trends indicate that energy prices 
will remain high, it is unclear how long Russia will be able to continue extracting and 
exporting natural resources.  More importantly, without a strongly diversified market, a  
 
                                                 
4 Eugene R. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia: Power in Weakness,” The Washington 
Quarterly 27:1 (Winter 2003-2004): 57-59. 
5 Ibid., 57. 
6 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 21, No. 2 (2005): 132-138. 
7 Rumer and Wallander, “Russia: Power in Weakness,” 63. 
8 Ibid. 
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serious shock to the global energy market could potentially cripple the Russian economy.  
Social, political, and economic stability could once again be replaced by instability, 
chaos, and hopelessness.9 
Economic development and diversification, however, will be impossible without a 
healthy, educated, and trained workforce.  Since the late 1970s, life expectancies in 
Russia have dropped as health problems have increased.  The problems were exacerbated 
by the political, economic, and social instability of the 1990s.  Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, death rates skyrocketed across the Russian Federation as birth rates 
dropped.  Since 1992, Russia’s population has fallen by more than six million and is 
projected to fall by another 14 to 21 million by 2025.10  The resulting loss of human 
capital in the Russian Federation, as health capital has fallen, may potentially upset future 
efforts at economic development.  Market diversification, even if actively pursued by a 
well-funded government, will prove elusive without an able workforce.   
The level of health capital, as represented by demographic indicators, has become 
serious enough that President Putin has repeatedly highlighted the crisis in his Annual 
Addresses to the Federal Assembly.11  Without a healthy, educated, and trained 
workforce, future economic growth will be very limited.  The Russian government has 
the opportunity now, while energy prices remain high and production levels are steady, to 
invest in reforms that would guarantee economic development for the long-term.  To 
date, however, government efforts have fallen short.  The focus of this research is to 
determine why government policy has failed consistently in its efforts to stop the decline 
of health capital.   First, however, it is important to understand the function of human 
factors (human and health capital) within a larger economic framework. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Regarding the dangers of Russia’s primary export driven economy Rumer and Wallander write: “Oil 
revenues, although providing a financial lifeline in the near term, have reduced incentives for modernizing 
Russian industry and for introducing much-needed and long-delayed structural reforms.”  See, Rumer, 63-
65.  See also Rudiger Ahrend, “Russia’s Post-crisis Growth: Its Sources and Prospects for Continuation,” 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 2006): 1-24. 
10 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Russia, the Sick Man of Europe,” Public Interest 158 (Winter 2005): 3-20. 
11 See the Russian Federation’s Presidential website at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/ for copies of 
President Putin’s Annual Addresses; last accessed on 10 January 2007. 
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B. THEORY: HUMAN AND HEALTH CAPITAL 
1. Economics 
In general, each society, or state, seeks to insure a continued existence, or what 
might be termed sustainable development.  For a society, as a unit and at the individual 
level, to survive certain functions must be performed.  Such functions require minimum 
stocks of various types of capital.12  Capital consists of “resources used to produce goods 
and services…which do not directly satisfy human wants.”13  In other words, capital must 
be produced to enable an economy to produce the final outputs desired for human 
consumption or use. 
Economic activity, at many levels, encapsulates societal attempts to sustain their 
existence.  Better economic performance, ceteris parabus, translates into a more stable 
and sustainable quality of life.  Economic performance can be expressed in terms of 
economic growth and economic development.  Economic growth, quite simply, is “a rise 
in national or per capita income and product,” which occurs in part through increased 
productivity. 14  A growing economy is desirable for two important reasons: 1) growth 
can improve the overall standard of living; and 2) increased resources, realized through 
growth, enables a state to deal with changing societal and economic needs more 
effectively.15   
Economic development, on the other hand, involves continual changes within an 
economic system.  Over the past two or three centuries these changes have included 
industrialization, urbanization, and evolving consumption patterns.16  Both economic 
growth and development utilize, or consume, stocks of capital.  Insufficient stocks of 
necessary capital will slow down or reverse growth and development.  Reduced 
economic activity negatively impacts stability and quality of life within a society, 
                                                 
12 Eric Welhelm Sievers, Sustainable Development and Comprehensive Capital: The Post-Soviet 
Decline of Central Asia (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001): 11.  For many 
economists, as noted by Sievers, sustainable development is development that will meet the needs of 
present and future generations. 
13 Campbell R. McConnell and Stanley L. Brue, Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993): G3. 
14 Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, Donald R. Snodgrass, Malcolm Gillis, and Michael Roemer, 
The Economics of Development (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001): 8-9. 
15 McConnell and Brue, Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies, 366. 
16 Perkins, Radelet, Snodgrass, Gillis, and Roemer, The Economics of Development 9. 
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threatening present and future sustainability.  Absent sufficient income in the face of 
declining economic performance, people are forced to look outside of the current societal 
structure for support and hope.  On the other hand, however, an economically successful 
society, which meets the needs of individuals and provides opportunities for obtaining 
some level of prosperity, has a stake in maintaining the status quo and avoiding the risks 
of unrest and violence.   
Recent economic research has highlighted the importance of human and health 
capital for effective economic development and continued growth.  People are not only 
the “ultimate beneficiaries” of economic development; they also “provide the most 
important input into the process.”17  Human capital, in its simplest form, perhaps could 
be defined as the overall contribution of people to economic activities.  It implies, 
however, more than a simple quantitative construct, expressed by the size of the labor 
pool.  More accurately, human capital is “the sum total of skills embodied within an 
individual: education, intelligence, charisma, creativity, [and] entrepreneurial vigor.”18  It 
is important to note the stock of human capital can be increased through education and 
training.19  Gary S. Becker, a noted economist, has written that: 
While all forms of capital—physical capital, such as machinery and plants, 
financial capital, and human capital—are important, human capital is the 
most important.  Indeed, in a modern economy, human capital is by far the 
most important form of capital in creating wealth and growth.20 
Relative to other forms of capital, human capital is important because it drives 
growth by increasing productivity.  According to Charles Wheelan, “productivity is the 
efficiency with which we convert inputs into outputs.”21  While dependent, at least in 
part, on natural resources, productivity in modern developed economies is driven more by 
                                                 
17 Perkins, Radelet, Snodgrass, Gillis, and Roemer, The Economics of Development, 245. 
18 Charles Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 2002): 99.  Wheelan writes that “our total stock of human capital—everything we know as 
a people—defines how well off we are as a society.”  See Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the 
Dismal Science, 105. 
19 According to Sievers, “indicators of human capital…involve literacy rates, levels of completion of 
various stages of formal education, number of scientists, and investments in research development.”  See 
Sievers, Sustainable Development and Comprehensive Capital,  21. 
20 As quoted by Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science, 106. 
21 Ibid., 107. 
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factors “affected by technology, specialization, and skills, all of which are a function of 
human capital.”22  Without continued investment in the required stocks of capital, 
productivity growth most likely will not occur.  Increasingly, in today’s modern 
economy, “human capital must be accorded priority in the sense that a certain minimum 
of it is a prerequisite to successful use of physical capital.”23 
2. Health Capital 
While many scholars and economists have included health as an additional 
component of human capital, much of the focus has been on the function of education.  
Health, however, must be differentiated because of its affect on human capital outside of 
the educational framework.  Human capital, in terms of a person’s level of knowledge, 
“affects…market and nonmarket productivity.”24  Health capital, on the other hand, 
preserves, or maintains, a society’s stock of human capital.  Absent good health, the 
workforce is less effective in its contributions to economic activity.25  Thus, an 
individual’s total productivity throughout life is a function of 1) human capital, or ability 
to contribute based on levels of education and skills; and 2) health capital which 
determines how long an individual will be capable of contributing to the market. 
Health capital essentially is a measurement of “healthy time.”26  Each individual 
is born with an initial stock of health capital which “depreciates with age and can be 
increased by investment.”27  Generally, health is measured by longevity of life and the 
rate of morbidity among the population.  Demographics provide a window into the health 
capital of a society, or country.  Population trends and longevity of life indicate levels of 
                                                 
22 Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science, 107. 
23 Richard B. Goode, “Adding to the Stock of Physical and Human Capital,” The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-first Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association (May 1959): 149. 
24 Michael Grossman, “The Human Capital Model of the Demand for Health,” Working Paper 7078 
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999): 2.  Found at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7078, accessed on 28 September 2006. 
25 Ibid., 2.  Grossman defines health as “longevity and illness-free days in a given year.” 
26 Michael Grossman, “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 80, No. 2 (March-April 1972): 223.  It is interesting to note that, unlike other 
forms of capital, human and health capital are “both demanded and produced by consumers.”  Also, 
whereas physical capital is only necessary in order to produce something that meets consumers’ demands, 
health and human capital fulfill both roles. 
27 Grossman, “The Human Capital Model of the Demand for Health,” abstract. 
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health capital.  For instance, drastic declines in population within a country over an 
extended period of time, especially in the absence of war or pestilence, are symptomatic 
of a lingering health crisis.  Strong economic development becomes less likely in such a 
situation.28   
The relationship between health and productivity, through the medium of human 
capital, is evident at various levels.  Health, according to David Bloom and David 
Canning, contributes to economic performance in four distinct areas.  First, labor 
productivity likely will be higher within a healthier population, “because their workers 
are physically more energetic and mentally more robust.”29  Further, an increase in the 
stock of an individual’s or a society’s health capital decreases the amount of time lost to 
illness, disease, or premature death.30  Research indicates that “an additional year of male 
life expectancy at birth has been associated with an increment of GNP per capita of about 
8 percent.”31  In terms of negative health indicators, falling population and increased 
morbidity requires a smaller workforce to support a growing group of retirees and 
disabled individuals, effectively raising social welfare expenditures at the cost of future 
capital needs.  Second, higher levels of health capital will increase the level of human 
capital by increasing the incentive to invest in education.  Longer life and better health 
increase the return on educational investments.  Third, as people live longer, the need to 
plan for retirement increases the amount of financial capital available for investment in 
additional physical capital.  Finally, health begets wealth which, in turn, can be invested 
again to increase health.  The resulting “virtuous spiral,” if protected, can ensure future 
economic growth.32  Negative population trends and falling life expectancy are indicators 
of a bleak future, which leads to decreased levels of human capital by removing the 
incentive for sufficient investment in education and technical training.  In short, sufficient 
                                                 
28 David E. Bloom and David Canning, “The Health and Wealth of Nations,” Science, New Series, 
Vol. 287, No. 5456 (February 2000): 1207-1209. 
29 Ibid., 1207. 
30 Grossman, “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,” 225.  Grossman writes 
that “the monetary value of this reduction is an index of the return to an investment in health.”  See same. 
31 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Russia’s Demographic Straightjacket,” SAIS Review XXIV, No. 2 (Summer-
Fall 2004): 20. 
32 Bloom and Canning, “The Health and Wealth of Nations,” 1207-1209. 
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stocks of health capital not only preserve human capital, it can also increase the level of 
human capital while also affecting economic growth in other ways. 
It is important, therefore, to understand what affects the level of health capital.  At 
the most obvious level, health capital is influenced heavily by factors such as lifestyle, 
healthcare, and other environmental issues.  These factors, however, are subject to 
external influences which demand closer scrutiny.  At the micro level, individual lifestyle 
and healthcare choices are affected by issues such as income, location, social mores, and 
cultural attitudes.  At the macro level, however, governmental policies, institutions, and 
attitudes play a significant role in shaping public lifestyle choices, the quality and 
availability of healthcare, and a host of other issues affecting the stock of health capital.  
It is important, therefore, to understand not only how governments affect health capital, 
but, it is also important to know why governments formulate policies as they do.  
Answers to these two questions hold the potential for improved decision and 
policymaking in the future. 
C. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Over the past three to four decades Russia’s health capital has been in decline.  
Government policies and efforts have failed to reverse or slow the decline.  The purpose 
of this thesis is to examine Russia’s declining health capital in light of government 
policy.  Specifically, it will seek to explain the continuity and consistency of the 
government policy in its failure to deal with Russia’s declining health capital effectively.  
Chapter II will explore a number of factors which possibly influence the formation of 
government policy connected to health capital.  This chapter will provide a foundation for 
determining potential explanations in the persistent inability of the Russian government 
to solve the country’s health and demographic crisis.  Chapter III will describe the current 
status of health capital in Russia, primarily in terms of health indicators and demographic 
measurements.  Chapter IV will highlight a number of government policies intended to 
deal with a variety of issues affecting health capital.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
illustrate the consistent failure of the government to compose and execute effective 




government policy affecting health capital in Russia consistently been ill-formulated and 
poorly executed.  Additionally, the chapter will offer a number of recommendations for 

























II. EXPLANATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore potential factors affecting the 
formulation and implementation of Russian government policy as it affects health capital.  
Specifically, the goal is to ascertain why government policy, over the past two to three 
decades, has consistently failed to slow the decline in health capital.  This chapter will 
present a number of possible variables, or factors, which may have influenced the 
formulation and implementation of policy in such a way as to prevent the creation of 
effective responses to the crisis of declining health capital.   
These potential explanations can be divided into four general arguments or 
categories for the purposes of this research: state-society relations, institutional, 
ideological, and economic.  Each will be examined in the context of how they might 
influence health capital through the formulation and implementation of government 
policy.  First, scholars point to an evident degree of continuity in state-society relations 
from tsarist Russia to the present.  The first section will explore three major themes 
which may contribute the continuity, perceived or real, in state-society relations.  The 
second section will explore the institutional and ideological factors which may influence 
government policy.  Finally, the constraints and effects of economic realities and goals on 
government policy will be explored in the third section. 
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Russia’s health capital has been in 
decline since before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The events of the 1990s 
accelerated a decades’ long decline in health capital, wreaking havoc on society as a new 
political and economic system emerged.  Despite recognition of the growing crisis by the 
governments of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, government policy 
has failed to effectively arrest the precipitous fall in health capital.33  While government 
policy obviously is not the only factor affecting the level of health capital in the Russian 
Federation, it can and does play a significant role.   
                                                 
33 See President Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly (10 May 2006), at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/speeches.shtml?type=70029, accessed on 16 February 2007. 
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Throughout the world, governments implement policies aimed at improving and 
maintaining health capital.  As previously mentioned, health capital is not only a matter 
of human rights, but also a necessary component of economic development and growth.  
Joseph Stalin and other early Soviet leaders recognized the need for a more reliable labor 
force and aggressively pushed for improved public health and social welfare.  As late as 
the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union succeeded in closely matching the West in public health 
improvements and level of health capital. From the 1970s on, however, Soviet health 
capital was in decline and government policies either ignored or failed to properly 
address the developing crisis.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in 
health capital has accelerated.  Both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, despite efforts 
at democratization and market reforms, have failed to develop or implement policies 
capable of effectively dealing with the crisis of declining health capital. 
A. STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
Due to the impact of government policy on health capital, it is critical to 
understand the political system within which states formulate and execute policy.  State-
society relations define the political system and determine the constraints placed on 
government policy and resource allocation. The political history of Russia has an 
important bearing on the formation of government policy because it has shaped how the 
state and the population interact.  State actions and decisions are impacted by the 
dynamics of state-society relations.  In the case of Russia, where political evolution took 
a distinctly different path than it did in Europe, the state has had relative freedom to act 
according to its own wishes.  Societal concerns, as voiced from below, rarely have 
occupied central stage in state affairs.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Communist Party 
suggested an imminent shift from authoritarianism to democracy.  Democratization in the 
Russian Federation, however, hit a serious speed bump with the failures of the Yeltsin 
administration to govern effectively.  Recent decisions and actions taken by the Putin 
administration suggest a noteworthy departure from earlier efforts at democratization.  
State-society relations in Russia appear to be reverting to the dynamic of extensive 
government control and limited public participation.  The apparent reemergence of an 
13 
authoritarian state in Russia, therefore, requires a close look at earlier historical periods 
which may have contributed to current political trends. 
1. Imperial Russia and the Patrimonial System 
For centuries in Russia, the relationship between the masses and the ruled was 
patrimonial. Russia’s historical patrimonial system can be defined as government 
dominated by “personal authority based on tradition” in which there “exist no formal 
limitations on political authority, nor rule of law, nor individual liberties.”34  The 
sovereign was entitled to make and enforce any decision it deemed desirable, without 
limited serious regard to the wishes of the governed.  The masses largely were powerless 
to influence their leaders or take any part in political decision-making.  Extensive control 
of Russia’s resources and property likely gave the tsar and the state the ability to maintain 
an authoritarian political system.35   
Overall, the patrimonial system did little to encourage an active partnership 
between the state and society.  Centuries with limited or no political influence did little to 
encourage a broad-based demand for political rights among the population.  Society was 
largely organized to serve the interests of the state and the sovereign.  The result was a 
government which often acted as it saw fit and a public that endured.  Based on average 
life expectancy at the end of the tsarist period, 30.9 years for men in 1896, issues of 
social welfare and public health were not a top priority of the state or of the population.36 
It is important to note that the tsar was not all-powerful within the framework of 
the patrimonial system.  Each successive tsar (and Russian/Soviet leader) was limited in 
their goals and actions by bureaucratic institutions and inadequate resources.37   
Additionally, there were a number of attempts, successful and unsuccessful, by the tsar 
                                                 
34 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin Books, 1995): 22-23. 
35 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999): xv.  See also Martin 
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and others to reform the patrimonial system.  Alexander II emancipated the serfs and 
attempted to increase the level of political participation among the population.38  Other 
political leaders, bureaucratic officials, and members of the intelligentsia also sought “to 
adapt imperial Russian society in one degree or another to the requirements of the 
modern world.”39  Nicholas II acquiesced to demands which limited his authority as tsar, 
albeit only partially and temporarily.   
2. Communist Paternalism 
As the Communists finished their revolution and consolidated their control of the 
state, the patrimonial relationship was not abandoned entirely, but adapted.  Political 
authority rested in the hands of an elite group of Party members.  Property was abolished 
or remained in the hands of the state; the population was left with little leverage over 
those making political decisions.40  The new Communist state, like the tsarist before it, 
continued to deny the population the right of political participation and used repression to 
enforce its will on any dissident elements.   
There was, however, an important change in state-society relations.  According to 
the dictates of Marxist-Leninism, the creation of socialism required that the “vanguard of 
the proletariat…enlighten the oppressed, uneducated, and fragmented Russian workers 
and peasants.”41  Creation of the new Soviet man demanded greater care by the state for 
the needs of the population.  Increased focus on education and healthcare allowed the 
state “to mobilize all material resources and human energies for the task of rapidly 
creating a ‘socialist’ society.”42  As a result, repression was augmented with the concept 
of a “social contract” between the state and the population.43  The basic premise of the 
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contract was an unwritten, unspoken agreement between the state and the society at large.  
In exchange for public cooperation and acceptance of the Communist Party’s “extensive 
and monopolistic power” the state would guarantee society “full and secure employment, 
state-controlled and heavily subsidized prices for essential goods, fully socialized human 
services, and egalitarian wage policies.”44  Gail Kligman describes this relationship as a 
paternalistic one, in which the “state structured dependency relations, simultaneously 
encouraging passivity from most members of society.”45 
Paternalism did result in a number of improvements in the standard of living and 
health capital for the Soviet citizens.  Between 1900 and 1939, the average life 
expectancy for both sexes rose from 32 to 43 years.  From the end of World War II, the 
increase in life expectancy was even more dramatic, rising to over 64 by 1965.46  In the 
long run, however, Soviet paternalism also had an enduring negative impact on Russia’s 
health capital.  The social contract at the center of the paternalistic relationship was 
dependent on economic growth.  The economic declines of the 1970s and falling oil 
prices on the world market reduced the cash flow into the Soviet Union and hindered the 
state’s ability to provide the material and welfare needs of the society.47  Stagnation of 
the Soviet economy had a number of deleterious effects on the population.  Living 
standards ceased to rise and began to fall.  Opportunities for social mobility disappeared.  
Public trust and confidence in the state began to dissipate.  At the same time, the state 
began to lose control over factors affecting the public. 
The rise and collapse of the paternalistic state in the Soviet Union had two direct 
effects on Russia’s level of health capital.  First, the state felt free to pursue policies 
aimed at keeping the Party in power rather than looking after the welfare of society.  
Healthcare was funded under the “residual principle” wherein all other government 
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functions were funded first.48  The process of making policy was shrouded in secrecy, 
preventing the public from understanding what was being done and why.49  The state, 
with limited accountability to society, proved willing to shirk its responsibility to societal 
well-being when faced with what it perceived as higher priorities.50  Second, society had 
come to rely on the state for almost all aspects of their well-being, including health needs.  
As a result, individuals had little incentive to look after their own health.  When the 
quality and availability of state health services declined, society was not prepared to take 
responsibility for its own needs, looking instead to the state to do its duty.51 
3. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 
Russia’s brand of bureaucratic institutions is another product of the rise of the 
patrimonial state.  Bureaucracy is important to a nation’s health capital because of its 
ability (or inability) or willingness (or unwillingness) to implement government policy.  
Policies aimed at improving health capital are subject to the efforts and intentions of the 
bureaucracy tasked with implementing the policy.  Additionally, the public’s perception 
of the bureaucracy, whether positive or negative, affects the level of trust in the system.  
In a country like Russia, where healthcare remains the primary responsibility of the state, 
trust in the willingness and ability of the bureaucratic institutions to meet government 
obligations is key in determining the attitude of the public towards the issues involved.  
The public often equates bureaucratic institutions with the state.  Lack of public trust in 
the ability of the Russian state to look after its health may increase the level of apathy of 
Russians towards their own health, resulting in unhealthy and risky personal behavior. 
A cursory look at the formation and functioning of Russia’s bureaucracy quickly 
reveals that it does not fit ideal model described by Max Weber.  The Weberian model of 
bureaucracy has been described as “efficient, apolitical, and highly qualified” containing 
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“an ethos of service to society.”52  Russian and Soviet bureaucracy can be described 
accurately as the antithesis of the Weberian model.  Since tsarist Russia, the bureaucracy 
has been the instrument of a self-interested state.  In essence, Russia’s bureaucracy 
became an independent caste “dominated by an ‘ethically negative occupational 
solidarity’ and an ideology of self-interest which was equated with state interest.”53  No 
civil society existed to provide a counterweight to the excesses of the bureaucracy.  This 
same system continued unabated throughout the Soviet era, formalized in the 
nomenklatura system of the Communist Party.  The state allowed the bureaucracy to 
extract wealth from the society in exchange for its support.  Corruption was an expected 
and normal part of interaction with Russia’s bureaucracy.54 
Another important aspect of tsarist and Soviet bureaucracies was its ability to 
limit the activities and efforts of the tsar and the Party leaders.  This feature, often 
referred to as bureaucratic authoritarianism, exists “when either a bureaucracy seizes 
power, turning itself in a governing party, or a party seizes power, turning itself into a 
governing bureaucracy.”55  While the bureaucracy in Russia has never exercised 
complete control of the state, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to influence 
government policy and to retain its authority by limiting the extent of any reforms aimed 
at weakening its power.56 
The Soviet bureaucracy, which only partly collapsed with Communism, has 
begun to rebuild itself with the tacit support of the Putin administration.  As Putin 
systematically weakened the oligarchs of the Yeltsin era, the bureaucrats returned to their 
positions of prominence and power in Russian society.  Today, in fact, Putin is often 
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limited in his ability to formulate and enact policy by a bureaucracy intent on preserving 
its position of authority and access to sources of wealth.  The current bureaucratic 
institution shows little concern for the welfare of society.  As described by Lilia 
Shevstova, in her book Putin’s Russia:  
The new authorities once again demonstrated their indifference, 
apparently thinking that the patience of the Russian people was unlimited.  
It was not so much that the state refused to increase spending on health 
and welfare, preferring [instead] to increase the budgets for the 
apparatchiks, defense, and special services.  More important was the fact 
that the state was not creating incentives for people to help themselves…57 
Public confidence in Russia’s government and bureaucratic institutions has 
remained low since before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While public approval of 
President Putin has been relatively high, trust in the rest of government has not.  A recent 
paper by Vladimir Shlapentokh details the negative attitudes of the public towards public 
institutions.  For instance, Shlapentokh points out that “there is no one institution that can 
garner more than 40-50 percent of the nation’s trust.”58   
Russia’s resurgent bureaucracy has the potential to exacerbate the current crisis in 
health capital while upsetting government attempts at modernization.59  First of all, 
attempts to reform healthcare or other welfare issues affecting health capital are subject 
to the efficiency and intentions of the bureaucracy.  It is likely that social welfare issues 
will continue to play second fiddle to issues considered more important by the current 
cadre of apparatchiks.  As the bureaucracy becomes more entrenched, it will be more 
difficult for future governments to enact any meaningful reforms.  Second, the corruption 
of the bureaucracy will consume much of the resources that may be intended for health 
improvements.  Finally, the inability of society to hold the bureaucracy accountable for 
incompetence and corruption will only further erode public trust in the state and increase 
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the overall level of hopelessness.  It is difficult for individuals to concern themselves with 
the long-term issues when the future is so uncertain.   
4. Summary 
The legacy of Russia’s political history continues to affect the formation and 
implementation of government policy in Russia today.  State-society relations, today, 
continue to exhibit some of the same tendencies common to what existed in tsarist and 
Soviet times.  Under President Putin, Russian society appears to be losing its ability to 
influence the government.  At the same time, the resurgence of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism may limit not only the accountability of state institutions to the public, 
but also the ability of the Russian president to formulate and enact polices as he desires.  
It appears that state-society relations in Russia and the Soviet Union did not necessarily 
encourage a heavy and permanent focus on issues affecting health capital. 
These continuities in state-society relations suggest the possible existence of a 
Russian political culture which has shaped the country’s political system.  Political and 
social scientists have debated the concept of culture and its explanatory value for 
decades.  The concept of culture seeks to encompass and synthesize the thoughts, actions, 
interactions, and overall behavior of individuals in order to describe society at large.  
Political culture, then, can be understood as a set of common perceptions, understanding, 
and ideas which influence the functioning of a political system.  While the primary 
purpose of political culture is to explain continuity, it is equally important to understand 
that political culture can and does evolve.60  Issues like health are ignored as daily 
survival consumes increasingly more time and energy.  There are two schools of thought 
on Russian political culture. One holds that there is only one dominant political cultural 
in Russia that is essentially paternalistic and authoritarian.61 The other points to an 
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alternative, though less dominant political culture that embraces democratic values and a 
more optimistic view to the future.62 The existence of such an alternative suggests the 
possibility of change away from paternalism. Whether political culture explains Russian 
health policy is considered in the concluding chapter. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS 
Within political systems there are a number of other institutional and ideological 
factors which are also capable of affecting government policies and, in turn, health 
capital.   These institutional and ideological features are influenced by both historical and 
modern forces.  This section will address three institutional features and one ideological 
facet which influence the formation of government policy in the Russian state.  In terms 
of institutional characteristics it will cover the weak democratic nature of the Russia’s 
current political system, the affect of Soviet healthcare on the current system, and the 
perception of policy being shaped by conservative moral judgments.  Finally, it will 
explore the affect of elite aspirations for modernization and recognition as a great power 
status.   
1. Weak Democratic Institutions 
Russia’s lack of a civil society, or what Celeste Wallander terms “civic activism” 
has limited the ability of the public to push an agenda for change onto the government.63  
The lack of strong democratic institutions in Russia is intricately linked with its political 
past.  The patrimonial and paternalistic systems of yesteryear effectively prevented the 
creation of a civil society that would be powerful enough to influence the government on 
matters such as public health.  The failure of Russia to realize “political competition and 
oversight” of the state has allowed the government a free hand in doing nothing 
substantial to rectify the growing health capital catastrophe.64 
                                                 
62 Nicolai Petro suggests that along with Russia’s paternalistic political culture another, more 
democratic and optimistic political culture competes for influence.  See Nicolai N. Petro, The Rebirth of 
Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).  
Frederic Fleron highlights empirical research suggesting strong support for democratic values within the 
Russian population.  See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., “Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of 
Recent Empirical Investigations,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March 1996): 225-260. 
63 Celeste A. Wallander, “The Politics of Russian AIDS Policy,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 389, 
(December 2005). 
64 Wallander, “The Politics of Russian AIDS Policy.” 
21 
Matthew Baum and David Lake conducted a series of studies which indicate that 
the level of democracy within a country affects the level of education attainment and life 
expectancy within a country.  In particular they note that: 
More democratic states tend to provide higher levels of public health, as 
measured by a variety of output indicators including infant mortality, life 
expectancy, and immunizations…the causal arrow appears to run from 
democracy to public health and education rather than the reverse.65 
Governments that are held accountable by the people tend to perform better at providing 
society the agreed upon services. 
 Where does the current Russian political system fit into the spectrum?  In his 
annual speech to the Federal Assembly in 2004 and 2005, President Putin stressed the 
importance of democracy in the Russia Federation.  He stated. 
No one and nothing will stop Russia on the path to consolidating 
democracy and ensuring human rights and freedoms…creating a free 
society of free people in Russia is our most important task.66 
I consider the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be 
our main political and ideological goal.67 
Despite Putin’s rhetoric concerning Russia’s democratic aspirations, in 2006 the Freedom 
House rated the country as “not free.”  In terms of political rights it received a rating of 6 
(1 being free and 7 not free on the spectrum), and a rating of 5 on civil liberties.  Russia’s 
ratings were similar to those found in the Central Asian Republics and Middle Eastern 
monarchies.68 
 Since assuming the office of President, Putin has consolidated power into the 
Federal Government.  All major television media either belongs to the government or is 
under the control of the government.  The government has used this control to influence 
public opinion regarding political issues and elections.  The activities of non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) have been curtailed and brought under increased 
scrutiny by the government, essentially weakening the chance for civil society to form 
around such institutions and issues.  Civil society, however, was not forgotten by the 
government.  In an attempt to improve appearances and gain public and international 
support for the Russian government, Putin oversaw the creation of the Public Chamber.  
Essentially the Chamber was organized by the government around issues for which the 
government desired increased public support.  With government funding and members 
appointed by the administration, the Chamber has supported the government’s agenda in 
the public realm.   
Scholars and observers of the political situation in Russia have struggled to define 
and accurately describe the system.69  Lilia Shevstova described Russia’s political 
institution a “hybrid regime,” 
 …founded on the principle of a weakly structured government and 
relying on both personalistic leadership and democratic legitimation.  This 
combination of incompatible principles enables the regime to develop 
simultaneously in various directions: toward oligarchy, toward 
authoritarianism, and towards democracy as well.  Yet such a regime can 
hardly be consolidated; its contradictory tendencies are a sure recipe for 
instability.70 
Others have described it as a “managed democracy,” in which 
…the leaders use government resources and manipulation to ensure that 
they will not be defeated in elections, although they do permit democratic 
institutions and groups to function to a limited extent.71   
Whatever the appropriate name or most accurate description, Russia’s current 
political system continues to allow the elite a relatively free hand in setting the national 
agenda.  A strong civil society is yet to emerge in Russia.  Within the framework of the 
current political system, society has little opportunity to effectively voice its concerns 
over issues affecting health capital; and the government has little reason to listen.  It is 
interesting to note that in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly in 2005, President 
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Putin mentioned the word democracy almost fifteen times.  In his 2006 address, he used 
the word only twice.72  Democracy in Russia seems to be slipping away and with it any 
realistic hope of an effective civil reaction to the crisis of declining health capital.   
2. Soviet Healthcare 
Russia’s inheritance of the Soviet healthcare system has proven to be a sizeable 
obstacle to improvements in health capital.  While Soviet healthcare policy will be 
covered in more detail in Chapter IV, it is important to highlight a few of the structural 
problems which have been passed on to the Russian Federation.   
First, the universal guarantee of state funded healthcare carried over from the 
Soviet Union to the Russian Federation.  The Soviet healthcare system met with 
considerable success in elevating the country’s health capital at least through the 1960s.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian Federation was 
unprepared and largely unable to adequately fund the national healthcare system.  The 
result of inadequate funding and resources was deterioration in healthcare facilities, 
equipment and overall services.   
Second, Soviet healthcare was focused on curative medicine, which proved 
ineffective at dealing with the epidemiological shift from infectious diseases (such as 
tuberculosis, influenza, hepatitis, and others) to non-communicable diseases (such as 
cardiovascular diseases).  The current healthcare system in the Russian Federation also 
has struggled to make the requisite transition from curative to preventive medicine.   
Third, the Soviet healthcare system, while largely based on Western medical 
models, had been cut off from cutting-edge medical technology and research.  As a result, 
doctors and administrators within the current healthcare system, limited by resources, are 
forced to choose between modernization and being able to treat as many patients as 
possible.  
Finally, health education, especially concerning sexual and reproductive issues, 
was seriously lacking in the Soviet Union.  This trend has carried over into the current 
system.  The result has been a catastrophic rise in sexually transmitted infections,  
                                                 
72 See President Vladimir Putin’s Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly (10 May 2006), at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/, accessed on 20 February. 
24 
non-communicable diseases, and health problems arising from behavioral choices  
(i.e. alcohol consumption and tobacco use).73 
Today, Russia’s healthcare system continues to struggle with these issues as well 
as several others inherited from the Soviet era.  As outlined in Chapter Four, efforts at 
government reform, thus far, largely have proven ineffective at rationalizing and 
modernizing the healthcare system.  Without significant improvements in technology, 
organization, and health education, health capital likely will continue to decline. 
3. The Victorian Impulse 
Political systems are also subject to the influence of institutional attitudes.   
Eduardo Gomez, in his paper on the HIV/AIDS crisis, points to a set of cultural or 
institutional attitudes that likely have influenced Russian policies affecting health capital 
as well.  In particular, Gomez claims that a “Victorian impulse dominates” the formation 
of government policy towards many health issues which are viewed as resulting from 
irresponsible or immoral personal choices.74  These Victorian views, a legacy of both the 
Russian Orthodox Church and Soviet conservatism, are prevalent among the ruling elite 
in government today.  As a result, efforts to ameliorate the suffering of society’s 
“sinners” have not been a top priority of government policy, resulting in inadequate 
funding of potentially lifesaving programs and treatments.   
Emerging health epidemics perceived to be caused by personal behavior, such as 
HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted infections, tuberculosis, hepatitis, as well as those 
brought on by consumption of alcohol, drugs, and tobacco, do not receive much 
sympathy from those in control of national resources and policy.  These Victorian 
tendencies may be increasing as the political influence and public support of the Russian 
Orthodox Church continues to rise.75 
                                                 
73 Soviet healthcare and its affect on healthcare in the Russian Federation are covered much more 
extensively in Chapter IV.  See Tragakes and Lessof, Health Care Systems in Transition: Russian 
Federation, 2003, 22-25, 104-105, 167; Mark G. Field, “Medical Care in the Soviet Union: Promises and 
Realities,” in Quality of Life in the Soviet Union, edited by Horst Herlemann (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1987): 65-82; and Rozenfeld, “The Crisis of Russian Health Care and Attempts at Reform.” 
74 Eduardo J. Gomez, “The Politics of Government Response to HIV/AIDS in Russia and Brazil,” 
Paper prepared for the conference Health and Demography in the Former Soviet Union, cosponsored by 
the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University (29-30 April 2005), 1-6. 
75 Shlapentokh, “Trust in Public Institutions in Russia: The Lowest in the World,” 163-164. 
25 
4. Modernization and the Pursuit of Great Power Status 
Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia’s relationship with Europe has consumed 
much of the efforts and attentions of the state apparatus.  Relative to Europe, the one 
word consistently employed to describe Russia is backward.  It has been Russia’s 
constant attempt to overcome its backwardness through modernization and recognition as 
a great power, specifically relative to West Europe and later the United States that has 
consumed the attention, efforts, and resources of the Russian state. 
While property ownership had contributed to the formation of the state in West 
Europe, the opposite had occurred in Russia.  As the West moved toward eventual 
democratization and market economies, Russia became more authoritarian.  In large part, 
Russia’s authoritarianism was fueled by the need to militarize in order to control the vast 
geographic space of the Empire.  Additionally, the Christian schism between the Roman 
Catholics and Orthodox Christianity also created an atmosphere of distrust and 
xenophobia in Russia, effectively isolating the country from Western influence for a 
number of centuries.76   
After his consolidation of authority as tsar, Peter the Great realized that Russia 
was economically and militarily inferior to Europe, and thus, at risk of invasion.  In 
response to this threat, Peter recognized that “the meager resources of the country had to 
be mobilized and squeezed to the limit by brutal state action.”77  Thus began the 
persistent efforts by each successive Russian leader, whether imperial, Soviet, or 
democratic, to overcome Russia’s backwardness through top-down reform and forced 
modernization.  Success was often measured in terms of international recognition of 
Russia’s great power status and through provocative comparisons with West Europe and 
the United States.  Almost a decade before the onset of World War II, Stalin clearly 
stated the overriding goal of the Soviet state: 
We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries.  We must 
run that same distance in ten years.  Either we do it or they crush us.78 
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Stalin’s crash industrialization allowed the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany 
and occupy much of Eastern Europe.  Victory brought recognition as a great world 
power, formalized by a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.  The start 
of the Cold War gave increased impetus to match the West, especially in military and 
nuclear capabilities.  Each successive Soviet leader sought to obtain parity with the West 
and each failed.  Forced modernization and the pursuit of great power status often forced 
issues such as social welfare and public health to the backburner of government policy.  
Limited time and investment were applied to solving and reversing the crisis in health 
capital that began to develop in the late 1960s.   
Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin sought to obtain parity with the West outside of the 
standard construct of forced modernization of military and industry.  Each attempted 
instead to involve the population in the political process in order to maintain Russia’s 
great power status.  Gorbachev’s reforms, however, remained a top down attempt to 
reorder society which failed amid collapsing public confidence and a self-destructive 
economic system. 79  The Yeltsin administration attempted to overcome the country’s 
backwardness by creating a market economy and a democratic form of government.   
Public trust in the government collapsed as the attempts at change failed to produce the 
promised results.  Yeltsin’s reforms, in large measure, failed due to ineffective planning 
and bureaucratic opposition to change.80 
Today, within the Putin regime, there is a revitalization of Russia’s attempt to 
achieve recognition as a great power and parity with the West.  Putin, however, has 
abandoned the early efforts by Yeltsin and Gorbachev to emulate the West in terms of 
democratic freedoms.  According to Andrei Tsygankov, Putin has focused on achieving 
“normal great power” status through market performance and integration with the West 
and the world at large.81  Modernization and economic development, as in Soviet times, 
remain central to Russia’s status as a great power.  The difference is that Putin has 
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abandoned the economic ideology of the Party, accepting the basic tenets of the free 
market, while rejecting the need to sacrifice any degree of national sovereignty in the 
process.  Another important aspect of Putin’s attempts to regain (or maintain) great power 
status has been a renewed challenge to the West, particularly the United States, in terms 
of global influence.  President Putin’s direct verbal attack on the United States and its 
foreign policy during a recent speech at a conference in Munich highlights this renewed 
effort to measure the greatness of Russia in terms of international influence.82 
 Russia’s consistent and resurgent efforts on achieving and maintaining parity with 
the West have never met with limited success.  Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia 
has been considered a great power.  This status was solidified further in the twentieth 
century with the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the space race.  The state 
has focused its efforts on ensuring economic growth and development in order to fund a 
formidable military (as in Soviet times) or to create a powerful economic force in terms 
of energy (as in the present day).  These efforts have distracted the state from addressing 
social welfare issues, such as health and human capital.  President Putin’s return to 
objectives similar to those pursued during the Cold War does not portend a likely 
increase in government interest in issues affecting health capital.  As Thomas Remington 
has noted: 
Over and over, modernization in Russian history has been imposed on 
society by autocratic rulers, generally with highly uneven effects on 
society.83 
The current push for modernization will likely have the same consequences as it has in 
the past.  Public health and social welfare problems will be kicked further down the road 
yet again. 
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It appears that health capital in Russia continues to be susceptible to serious 
institutional and ideological obstacles.  Failure to address these issues may result in a 
persistent drain on national health and resources.  Health and social welfare issues in 
Russia continue to compete for the government’s attention and limited resources.  As 
long as the government is focused on its international image and elite priorities, however, 
it is unlikely that health capital will be addressed adequately in terms of policy.  At the 
same time, persistent misperceptions among Russia’s elite have resulted insufficient 
efforts to control widening of dangerous and deadly epidemics, putting the entire 
population at greater risk. 
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Government policy towards health capital is subject to the influence of economic 
realities and decisions.  Budgetary concerns often determine the shape and form of 
government policy.  Russia’s health capital has suffered since the low-tide of Soviet 
economic performance in the 1970s due to limited government funding.  Insufficient 
national resources seem to have impacted particularly the health capital of Russia.  With 
the government largely free to act without tremendous concern for social needs, limited 
resources have been directed toward elite priorities.  Today Russia faces two specific 
economic challenges that affect the quality of government policy as it affects health 
capital: income per capita and primary export dependency. 
1. Income and Health Capital 
Household income plays a direct role in the level of health capital.  In economic 
terms, health capital is a stock which can be increased, to a point, by investment.  
Investments in health capital include health diets, time to exercise, and access to quality 
healthcare.  Each of these investments consumes resources, and in a market economy 
requires money.84  It follows that higher wages, or higher GDP per capita, could translate 
into higher health capital.  Also, according to Michael Grossman, “the higher a person’s 
wage rate the greater is the value to him of an increase in healthy time.”85  In other 
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words, higher wages can translate into hope for a healthier future.  A hopeful future in 
turn can encourage more careful planning, healthier choices, and fewer risky behaviors. 
On the other hand, low incomes, can produce the opposite effect.  Less money 
means fewer resources to protect and develop good health.  The time horizon for the 
future shortens, and planning for health fades in importance.  Also, lower household 
incomes put greater responsibility on the state to provide the resources necessary for a 
high standard of healthcare and social welfare.  When government allocations for 
activities important to health are limited, the situation becomes troublesome.   
In this context, Russia is a particularly interesting case.  For decades healthcare 
and other forms of social welfare have been provided by the state, free of charge.  Today, 
the Russian Federation still assumes primary responsibility for such issues.  Due to 
limited funding, however, the state system is quickly becoming overwhelmed and greater 
numbers of Russians are forced to turn to privatized healthcare.  Russians are not used to 
the idea of using their wages to pay for social services, as evidenced by the unpopularity 
of recent decisions by the Putin administration to monetize social benefits.  Many 
Russians balk at the idea of using actual currency to pay for healthcare, unless absolutely 
necessary.  The unfortunate result is that many are suffering from ill health due to 
unwillingness or inability to pay for medical care, contributing to the increase in 
morbidity and mortality.   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian citizens have, on average, had low 
wages compared to the rest of the developed world.  The unwillingness and inability of 
the Russian population to adapt to healthcare based on market forces has further 
overwhelmed the limited resources offered by the government.  As indicated by the 
comparisons in the table below, there appears to be a correlation between GDP, (or GNI), 







Table 1.   Income and Health Capital86 
Country GNI per capita, Atlas 
Method (US$) 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Infant Mortality Rate 
(per 1,000 live births) 
Russia 3,410 65 17 
Ukraine 1,270 68 14 
Kazakhstan 2,300 65 63 
China 1,500 71 26 
Poland 6,140 75 7 
Germany 30,690 79 4 
United States 41,440 77 7 
The effectiveness of government policy in addressing the health crisis in Russia 
(discussed in the next chapter) is limited by the low income of the population.   
2. Primary Export Dependency 
Russia’s reliance on oil as its primary export commodity may also be contributing 
to the decline in health capital.  National economies dependent on primary exports “tend 
to under-perform relative to resource deficient economies” on several fronts.87  Resource 
dependence, due to a number of factors, inhibits productivity and economic growth.  
Often local currency appreciates through the effect of what is termed Dutch Disease.  
This appreciation negatively impacts sectors outside of the primary export. 88  It has been 
noted among economists that these effects can spill over into the realm of health.   
Michael Ross of the University of California at Los Angeles has highlighted the 
fact that countries dependent on primary exports such as oil and other minerals “fare 
worse on child mortality and nutrition, have lower literacy and school-enrollment rates 
and do relatively worse on measures like the UN’s Human Development Index.”89  This 
effect may partly be explained by the fact that the poor are less able to adjust to the 
changing boom and bust cycle inherent in primary export economies resulting in falling 
real income.  As real income falls negative health trends become apparent.  With 
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healthcare more expensive, people may be more likely to ignore health issues and 
nutritional needs suffer as dietary choices become more restrictive.   
Further, reliance on primary exports can break down civic activism in two ways.  
First, a government reliant on primary export revenues in lieu of taxes has less incentive 
to interact with society.  A government reliant on tax collection from the population is 
forced to deal with the people on a more intimate level.  Such close interaction often 
results in exchange of information between the government and the public over how the 
money should be spent.  Governments that are not reliant on the population for tax 
revenues are less likely to concern themselves with the needs or concerns of the 
population.  Advocates for better health services and issues affecting health may go 
unnoticed.90  It is important to point out, however, that beginning in 2001 revenues from 
income tax increased significantly.  It remains to be seen if this increase in state reliance 
on the population for revenues will translate into increased political leverage for the 
population.  Over the short run, though, little has changed.91 
Also, a country awash in energy revenues can afford to ignore the deeper, 
institutional causes of declining health care and falling living standards.  Funds, instead 
of being directed at such problems, are instead used to pursue other national goals.  In the 
case of President Putin, the focus has been on continued economic development, 
particularly back into the energy market.  As evidenced by recent events, Russia is using 
its energy exports as a foreign policy tool in its relations with neighboring states.  Such 
efforts go back to the discussion of great power ideology.  Once such money is gone, 
however, the deeper problems remain, often exacerbated by ignorance and time. 
The Putin administration, however, has made one significant attempt to use 
increased energy and tax revenues to reform some social services available to pensioners 
and others considered disadvantaged.  Beginning in January 2005, the government 
replaced several subsidized services, such as “free public transportation, low-cost 
electricity, free medicine for invalids and rent-free apartments for many government 
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workers” with cash payments averaging around $70.92  Putin’s attempt to institute limited 
neoliberal social reforms, while considered economically wise by many, proved too much 
for the affected portion of the population.  In this instance, widespread protests succeeded 
in forcing the government to roll back some of the reforms.  Unfortunately, the likely 
result may be further deterioration in the quality and availability of social services offered 
by the state.93 
3. Summary 
State policy affecting health capital is subject to economic factors.  Historically 
low income has limited the effectiveness of Russia’s current government policies 
addressing health and social welfare issues.  The current boom in world energy prices has 
flooded the Russian government and society with money.  As yet, however, these funds 
have not translated into overt improvements in health capital.  Government policies and 
programs involving health and social welfare continue to be under-funded, while money 
is directed back at further economic development in the energy sector.  It remains to be 
seen if rising incomes will eventually translate into increased health capital.  Increased 
income, however, will be insufficient to raise health capital on its own.  Both social 
services and the healthcare system must be modernized as well. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Government policy is particularly important to the level of health capital in 
Russia.  Within the Russian Federation, the government maintains primary responsibility 
for the health and social welfare of the population.  The current status of health capital in 
Russia suggests, however, that government has fallen short in its responsibility to society.  
The factors detailed above indicate that the Russian government faces a number of 
challenges in setting and implementing effective policies and reforms aimed at dealing 
with the worsening crisis.  Many of these challenges are self-imposed.  A long-term 
increase in health capital will likely require significant changes at all levels.  The next 
chapter will detail the current status of health capital in Russia, which is the result of 
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government and societal neglect over the last three to four decades.  It will illustrate the 
gravity of the situation and highlight the need for serious efforts by the government and 
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III. CURRENT STATUS OF RUSSIA’S HEALTH CAPITAL 
Health capital in the Russian Federation has been in steady decline for at least 
three decades.  This chapter will examine the status of Russia’s health capital in terms of 
population trends, longevity of life, epidemiology, and healthcare.  Demographic trends 
generally do not change overnight.  The tempo of a particular trend may change, but, 
absent war, pestilence, or natural disaster, “demographic changes are very slow and very 
regular.”94  A look at current population trends will provide a clear snapshot of the 
deteriorating condition of Russia’s health capital.  Birth and death rates, which together 
drive a society’s population trends, are influenced heavily by morbidity rates.  Average 
life expectancies, in turn, are a function of the factors which lead to death.  These factors 
include deaths resulting from accidents and violent deaths, as well as, those caused by 
illness and disease.  The status and ability of healthcare systems to meet medical needs 
also affects the overall level and quality of health capital. 
A. POPULATION CHANGE AND THE ECONOMIC EFFECT 
The degree of population decline and rampant increase in morbidity threaten to 
undermine Russia’s recent economic successes.   President Putin has recognized the 
gravity of the situation and addressed it repeatedly in his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly.95  Since 1992, Russia’s population has declined by over 4 percent from 148.7 
million to 142.2 million.  Current projections vary, but the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
U.N. Population Division estimate that Russia’s population will decline by 14 to 21 
million by 2025, losing between 560,000 to 840,000 a year.96  By 2050, Russia’s 
population possibly could fall to 101.5 million.97  Russia’s population decline is driven 
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by the significant difference between the birth and death rate.  Presently, for every 100 
births in Russia there are more than 160 deaths; the population will decline by 
approximately 700,000 this year.98  The reasons are varied and complex.   
As previously noted, sizeable declines in population are indicative of serious 
health issues.  As Russia’s population continues to decline, its available labor pool will 
shrink, restricting possibilities for continued economic growth and development.  
Additionally, modern capitalism depends on a “vigorously expanding domestic market,” 
and a shrinking population will translate into a smaller customer base.99  A smaller 
customer base diminishes the incentives for production and future investment.  It will 
likely take a full generation, or more, to replace the Russia’s disappearing stock of human 
capital.  Severe population decline, as Russia is experiencing, also poses a threat to 
national security.  A recent report by the World Bank suggests three potentially negative 
results for national security.  First, the pool of future conscripts will be significantly 
smaller, reducing the ability of the armed forces to maintain required manning and 
readiness levels.  Second, a large portion of the national budget may be diverted away 
from the military to fund social welfare programs such as healthcare and pensions.  Third, 
the potential economic losses incurred through population loss may upset internal 
stability and security.100 
As the difference between birth and death rate widens, Russia’s population will 
not only shrink, it will also age.  Low birth rates, particularly when below replacement 
levels, mathematically translate into an aging population.  Or in other words, a population 
ages when the birth rate is not sufficiently high enough to replace the existing 
population.101  This phenomenon, particularly as it affects the working age cohort of the 
population, can result in a number of social welfare problems.  Pensions will likely fall as 
smaller workforces are unable to provide a sufficient fiscal base for the larger and older, 
non-working generations.  Many retirees will be forced to work longer in order to 
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supplement their pensions and to make up the shortfall in the labor markets.  Future 
economic growth may be sacrificed as resources are used to prop up expanding social 
welfare programs.102 
The Russian government’s heavy reliance on energy revenues puts the state at 
even greater risk as the population continues to shrink.  Currently, high world energy 
prices produce sufficient revenues for the Russian government to meet its obligations and 
maintain a relatively stable society.  A drop in world energy prices, combined with a 
declining and ageing population, possibly could overwhelm the Russian state.   It is 
unlikely that a shrinking Russian population could provide sufficient tax revenues to 
make up for the loss incurred by lower energy prices.  In such a case, the Russian 
government likely would be forced to curtail its spending or find other sources of 
revenue.  The political implications of such a scenario offer few visions of a hopeful 
outcome.  A recent quote in the editorial of The Washington Post describes the 
developing crisis in Russia: “Populations will age, the customer base (for businesses) will 
shrink, there will be labor shortages, the tax base will decline, pensions will be cut, 
retirement ages will increase.”103 
As previously mentioned, Russia’s population is aging as fertility rates continue 
to remain low.  According to the UN, a population can be classified as “aging” when 
“persons 65 and older account…for over 7 percent of the total population.”104  As of 
2005, Russia’s population fits this description with 13.7 percent of the population over 
65, up from 12.4 percent in 2001.105  It is estimated that by 2025 the median age for the 
15-64 age cohort of the population “will be about 42 years…three-and-a-half years higher 
than today.”106  If this trend continues, as it appears it will, pensions and social welfare 
for the growing retiree population will be forced to depend on a continually shrinking 
workforce. Beginning in 1998, the population of retirees has exceeded that of the under-
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working age cohort.  Since 2000, the gap between the two age cohorts has grown from 
one million to over five million.107 In terms of population support ratio (PSR), or the 
number of working age members of the population to the aged, non-working portion of 
the population, the situation in Russia will measurably worsen.  The U.S. Census Bureau 
estimates that Russia’s PSR, over the next 25 years, will fall from 5.5:1 to 3.3:1.108 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Fertility Rate 
While fertility rates in Russia have risen some over the last five years, they 
remain at around 1.32 births per woman compared to the net replacement rate of 2.33.109  
In 2003, Russia had the sixth lowest fertility rate in the world.110  Compared to Europe, 
Russia’s fertility rate does not seem irregular.  While slightly lower than fertility rates in 
northern Europe, fertility rates in Russia are similar to those found in southern Europe.  
There are important differences, however.  Declining fertility rates in Europe are largely 
due to the increased number of women pursuing education and careers, increased control 
over reproductive choices, and access to higher quality healthcare.  In Europe, where the 
concept of success has evolved, families are either postponed or kept small.111  
In Russia, on the other hand, the causes of falling fertility rates are affected not 
only by personal choices, but, by serious external environmental and health factors.  
Economic, social, and health issues are suppressing the birth rate.  Despite relative 
stability and economic success since 2000, the tumultuous events of the 1990s have not 
been forgotten.  Fear of an uncertain future continues to affect the population. Low 
income and housing shortages combined with uncertainty dissuade potential parents from 
starting or expanding their families.  The problem is further exacerbated by what 
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Nicholas Eberstadt refers to as the “Marriage Question.”112  Fewer young Russians are 
getting married and divorce rates are on the rise.  Over the 20 years prior to 2001, 
marriage rates in Russia fell by one-third and divorce rates rose by the same.  In 1995, 
only about 75 percent of young people were likely to get married, while the odds of 
divorce had risen to 50 percent.  The decline in the number of two parent families and the 
instability of marriage has contributed to the declining fertility rate.  As marriage rates 
have dropped along with birth rates, the proportion of out-of-wedlock newborns more 
than doubled between 1987 and 2001, further straining a diminishing social welfare 
system. Potential parents, especially mothers, are less willing to give birth in the absence 
of a secure family environment.113 
The steady rise in the rate of medical infertility among the Russian population, 
however, indicates a significant negative trend in terms of health capital.  While estimates 
of the level of medical infertility in Russia vary, it is obvious that the numbers are 
significant.  Current estimates put the level of infertility among married couples of 
childbearing age between 13 and 30 percent.114  Russia’s high incidence of sterility, in 
large part, is attributable to the negative impact of heavy reliance on abortion as the 
primary method of birth control and on the increase in sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs). 
For decades, women in Russia have had little choice in matters of reproductive 
health.  In most of the world, as Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich point out, 
“contraception was widely available or used before abortion was legally available.”115  In 
most of the world, contraceptives were legalized before abortion as the primary method 
of birth control.  The reverse took place in Russia.  Absent reliable contraceptive 
alternatives, abortion has been the routine form of birth control for the last 50 years.  
Women of childbearing age have on average three abortions during their lifetime, or 1.7 
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abortions for every live birth.116  It is not uncommon for a woman to have more than 10 
abortions during her childbearing years.  Out of all women who have been pregnant in 
Russia, three out of four have had an abortion.117  Many Russian doctors estimate that 
over 4 million abortions are performed each year, while officially the number is around 
1.7 million.118 
Russia’s reliance on abortion has negatively impacted the health and size of the 
population.  Besides the direct effect of abortion on population, the health cost is proving 
astronomical.  Vladimir Serov, the chief gynecologist in the Health Ministry, points to 
complications from repeated abortions as the principal cause of infertility among women, 
with STIs coming in second.119  Based on studies conducted during the 1990s, Julie 
DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich collected startling data tracking the effects of abortion 
on the reproductive health of Russian women.  In their work for RAND, they noted that 
health complications resulted in two of every three abortions.  These complications not 
only stressed the healthcare system further, they also often led to “high rates of secondary 
sterility.”120  It is estimated that one out of every ten abortions leads to secondary 
sterility.  In light of the fact that Russian women have an average of three abortions 
during a lifetime, the probability of being rendered sterile is significant.  During the 
1990s, abortion triggered one in four maternal deaths; approximately 90 percent of those 
deaths were the outcome of illegal abortions.121 
Sexually transmitted infections are the second leading cause of infertility among 
women in Russia.  They affect men’s health as well.  As Murray Feshbach noted, “these 
diseases cripple and kill, damage reproductive health, and are associated with the spread 
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of HIV/AIDS.  Feshbach attributes the explosive spread of STIs to increased promiscuity 
driven by greater access to pornography and a growing prostitution industry.  Increased 
drug abuse involving shared needles and syringes has added an entirely new dimension to 
the problem.122  The rate of curable and treatable STIs is extremely high in Russia 
compared to other industrialized countries.  It is estimated that 15 percent of college 
students in St. Petersburg carry at least one STI.  For example, “the incidence of syphilis 
in 2001 was one hundred times higher in Russia than in Germany.”123  In 1997, 450,000 
new cases of syphilis were reported by the Ministry of Health.124  According to the 
Federal State Statistics Service, the incidence of urogenital diseases has increased 
steadily from 37.6 per 1,000 of the population in 2000 to 45.7 per 1,000 of the population 
in 2004.125 
2. Mortality Rates 
Russia’s mortality rates have risen steadily over the last 40 years, with 
considerable increases since 1987.  Low birth rates are the leading cause of Russia’s 
population decline, but when combined with current mortality rates the result is much 
more pronounced.  Expressed in crude numbers the annual number of deaths in Russia 
has risen from an average of fewer than one million in the 1960s to over two million 
since 1993.126  At the current mortality rate, Russia would have to achieve a fertility rate 
of somewhere between 2.15 and 2.33 to reach the population replacement level.127  In 
2005, deaths exceeded births by more than 846,000, a ration of 1.6 deaths for every one 
birth.128 
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Crude numbers of deaths make it difficult to compare health and mortality rates 
between populations because aging conditions and structures can vary significantly 
across societies.  Demographers use statistics on life expectancy at birth to develop a 
clearer picture of mortality rates and the underlying health conditions of a society.  For a 
given year, life expectancy at birth “is a statistical calculation based on the age-specific 
mortality rates of that year.”129  Life expectancy data, as a measurement of overall health 
within a society, corresponds strongly to economic performance.  As mentioned above, 
each “additional year of male life expectancy at birth has been associated with an 
increment of GNP per capita of about 8 percent.”130 
In the mid-1960s, Russian life expectancy at birth was close to that in the United 
States for both men and women.  Male life expectancy reached 64 years in 1965 before 
declining to 61.7 years by 1980.  Male longevity, however, did experience a short 
rebound during Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign of 1984-1987.  By 1987, Russian 
male life expectancy had reached its all time high of 64.9 years.  Female life expectancy 
remained relatively static from 1970 until the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Between 
1970 and 1989, female life expectancy increased by just more than a year, from 73.4 to 
74.5.131   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, life expectancy at birth has fallen for both 
males and females in the Russian Federation.  Between 1992 and 2004, male life 
expectancy fell from 61.9 to 58.9 years and female life expectancy fell from 73.7 to 72.3 
years.132  For 2003, life expectancies in the United States were 74.8 years for men and 
80.1 years for women.133  Russia’s working age population has been especially hard hit 
by the “upsurge in death rates.”134  Female workers, between the ages of 20 and 59,  
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suffered at least a 30 percent increase in the death rate between 1970 and 2001.  Over the 
same period, males between the ages of 40 and 59 experienced an increased death rate 
that often reached 60 percent.135 
 
Table 2.   Life Expectancy at Birth in Russia, 1896-2004136 
Year Males Females Year Males Females Year Males Females 
1896 30.9 33.0 1985 62.7 73.3 1998 61.8 72.8 
1926 39.3 44.8 1987 64.9 74.3 1999 59.9 72.0 
1938 40.4 46.7 1990 63.8 74.3 2000 59.0 72.3 
1958 61.9 69.2 1992 62.0 73.8 2001 58.9 72.2 
1965 64.0 72.1 1995 58.3 71.7 2002 58.7 71.9 
1970 63.0 73.4 1996 59.8 72.5 2003 58.6 71.8 
1980 61.4 73.0 1997 60.8 72.9 2004 58.9 72.3 
 
For demographers and health experts, the large gap between male and female life 
expectancies in Russia is a concern.  The current gap of more than 13 years is among the 
largest in the world.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only seven other nations in 
2001 had gaps between the sexes that exceeded 10 years.  Six of them were former Soviet 
republics.137  The numbers point to a disproportionate failing of men’s health.  In Russia, 
the probability of a male child born today living to the age of 60 is only 55 percent.  In 
the United States, the probability is 88 percent.  Since 1972, life expectancy for Russian 
males has fallen by almost five years.  In only four years, 1990-1994, “mortality 
increases among males aged  35-44,  45-54,  and  55-64  were so great as to  
reduce overall life expectancy by more than a year.”138  Understanding the health  
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issues that are pushing Russia’s mortality rates ever higher is essential to comprehending 
the effect, or lack thereof, of government policy. 
For the Russian male, the fluctuation in the mortality rate since 1984 is the 
consequence of changing health problems.  As DaVanzo and Grammich point out, the 
Russian male has been on a rollercoaster since the 1980s.  Throughout the 1980s, male 
life expectancy rose and fell in response to the short-lived anti-alcohol campaign.  From 
1992 to 1994, as the Soviet Union came apart and Russian’s entered a period of 
uncertainty and hardship, “male life expectancy decreased by four and a half years, 
reaching its lowest level in four decades.”139  Between 1994 and 1998, male life 
expectancy increased by more than four years; by the end of 2004, however, it was down 
again by three years.140 
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are now the primary cause of death within 
the Russian Federation as the society has undergone a shift in the “patterns of health and 
disease.”141  The study of epidemiology, which concerns itself with disease, death, and 
all contributing factors, has indicated that developing societies progress through a series 
of phases in what is termed the epidemiological transition.  In terms of theory, the 
epidemiological transition attempts to explain “the complex change in patterns of health 
and disease [within a society] and on the interactions between these patterns and their 
demographic, economic and sociologic determinants and consequences.”142  As countries 
have progressed through the various stages of development, a strong, historical 
correlation has emerged between shifts in demographic and technological transitions, on 
one hand, and epidemiological trends, on the other.  Primarily, the epidemiological 
transition is evident in terms of enduring changes “in mortality and disease patterns.”143   
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As outlined by Abdel Omran, the epidemiological transition has three distinct 
phases.  First, there is the “Age of Pestilence and Famine” in which high mortality rates 
suppress population growth; average life expectancy at birth remains between 20 and 40 
years.  Second, societies experience the “Age of Receding Pandemics.”  During this 
phase, death rates fall as pestilence, famine, and the spread of infectious diseases become 
less common.  The rate of NCDs increases, while infectious diseases remain the leading 
cause of death.  Average life expectancy at birth increases to between 30 and 50 years.  
Third, developed societies enter the “Age of Degenerative and Man-Made Disease.”  In 
this stage communities have developed the capabilities and mechanisms to deal with 
causes of early death, such as infectious diseases and famine.  As a result, individuals live 
long enough to suffer physiological damage from a number of behavioral choices and 
environmental factors, which previously had not affected health or mortality due to low 
life expectancy.144  Russia, and the Soviet Union at large, began to make the transition to 
degenerative and man-made diseases in the 1960s, as life expectancy at birth neared its 
peak and the rate of deaths caused by NCDs began to increase significantly.145   
A number of leading causes of mortality are easily linked to behavioral choices.  
In particular, cardiovascular disease (CVD) and sudden cardiovascular failure, the 
leading cause of the increased mortality rates, are often directly attributable to individual 
behavior and lifestyle choices.  Virtually all of the increase in women’s mortality rates is 
attributable to CVD and related factors.  Compared to the rest of the world, today’s 
Russia may have the highest rates of CVD death rates than “ever suffered by any national 
population in all of human history.”146  The increase in CVD deaths caused “nearly half 
the decrease in life expectancy from 1992 to 1994.”147  Cardiovascular diseases,  
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by their nature, are closely tied to lifestyle and social behaviors “involving diet,  
exercise, smoking, and heavy drinking.”148 
Alcohol consumption in Russia seems to be a national pastime, deeply ingrained 
into the culture.  According to a poll conducted by The Public Opinion Foundation 
Database, vodka is generally the drink of choice for roughly 36 percent of the drinking  
population, with 10 percent of them consuming at least a half liter of vodka weekly.  The 
poll also states that two percent of the drinking population report consuming up to three 
liters of vodka per week.149   
As Murray Feshbach states, the preponderance of vodka produced for domestic 
consumption “comes with a tear-off top rather than a replaceable cork or screw top 
because it’s assumed that the bottle, once opened, will not be returned to the 
refrigerator.”150  Approximately 40 percent of the Russian population admits to 
consuming alcohol multiple times within a month, with another 32 percent admitting to 
imbibing several times a year.151   
According to official statistics the per capita consumption of absolute alcohol 
among the drinking age population is around 30 quarts, or the equivalent of “some 75 
half-liter bottles of 80-proof vodka” per person per year.152  Feshbach estimates that 20 
million Russians, or one-seventh of the population, qualify as alcoholics.153  Compared to 
world and other national averages, per capital alcohol consumption in the Russian 
Federation are appreciably high. 
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Table 3.   Alcohol Consumption Per Capita in Liters154 
 Total Unrecorded Spirits 
World 5.1 NA 1.7 
Russian Federation 10.58 4.9 7.64 
United States 8.54 NA NA 
Ukraine 4.04 8.0 NA 
Alcohol consumption contributes to death both directly and indirectly.  First, 
alcohol consumption can contribute to secondary health problems, such as CVD.155   A 
study by the World Health Organization, conducted during 1993-1994, discovered that 20 
percent of sudden deaths from cardiovascular failure involve significant levels of alcohol 
intoxication, “with blood alcohol concentrations of 3.5 g/l or higher found in the 
victim.”156  Approximately 10 to 30 percent were found with lower blood alcohol 
levels.157  Second, alcohol consumption contributes to the mortality rate directly through 
alcohol poisoning and other diseases caused by alcohol abuse.  As of 2000, the annual 
death toll from alcohol poisoning was estimated at 35,000 compared to only 300 in the 
United States.158  The number of deaths per 100,000 caused by alcohol poisoning, in 
1994, was around 37.4.159  While long-term alcohol consumption contributes to the 
incidence of CVD, binge drinking, a prevalent aspect of Russian culture, also carries a 
heavy burden which leads to spikes in “sudden death from alcohol poisoning, accidents, 
and violence” during weekends and holidays.160  One estimate puts the annual number of 
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deaths attributable to alcohol consumption between 500,000 and 700,000, making alcohol 
“responsible for 30 percent of all deaths.”161 
Smoking has contributed to the CVD mortality, as well.  It is estimated that 
“smoking shortens life expectancy by 6.7 years for men and 5.3 years for women.”162  A 
recent poll indicates that 40 percent of Russian adults are tobacco smokers.  In terms of 
gender, however, the poll indicates that 66 percent of men smoke compared to 17 percent 
of women.163   According to the World Health Organization, around “14 percent of all 
deaths in 1990 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were traceable to smoking-related 
illnesses; they expect that number to rise to 22 percent by 2020.”164  Rising CVD deaths, 
furthermore, have been linked to the increased stress levels caused by the uncertainty and 
disorder following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The turbulence of the early 1990s 
also led to a twenty-fold increase in poverty levels, which likely increased the stress and 
the ability of the Russian population to maintain their health.165 
Dietary intake in the Russian Federation, typically “high in animal fat and salt, 
and low in fruits and vegetables,” also has contributed considerably to the rise of CVD 
and other serious health problems.166   Beginning in Soviet times, food choice was 
limited.  While nutritionally sufficient, the normal Soviet diet “was unbalanced by an 
excess of carbohydrates and fatty meats, shortages in fresh fruits and vegetables in winter 
months and a lack of variety.”167   Today,  despite opportunities to eat healthier,  
many Russians continue to consume unbalanced diets.   Estimates indicate that as  
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much as 28 percent of the increase in CVD mortality in Russia may be attributable  
to lower consumption of fruits and vegetables.168 
The lack of micronutrients, especially iodine, is a serious concern.  Iodized salt 
has not been produced in Russia and little has been imported since 1991.  Iodine 
deficiencies can cause mental retardation in young children and other health issues for 
adults.  Russians also are faced with a shortage of “folic acid as well as vitamins A, B 
complex, D, and E among 30 percent of the population.”169  At the same time, increased 
salt intake (non-iodized) has contributed to high blood pressure among significant 
portions of the population, contributing to the start of CVDs among those affected.  High 
blood pressure, or hypertension, affects between 34 and 46 percent of Russia’s adult 
population.  Type 2 Diabetes, which is generally attributed to what might be termed 
unhealthy lifestyle choices, is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the Russian 
population.  As of 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked Russia among 
the top 10 of countries negatively impacted by diabetes, with a prevalence rate of more 
than 3 percent (compared to the world average of 2.5 percent).170 
Experts also point to other contributors to the increased mortality rate, such as an 
increase in violence and the lingering threat of environmental damage.  The level of 
violent deaths in Russia, a society largely at peace, is strikingly high.  Nicholas Eberstadt 
highlights this growing problem: 
For men under 65 years of age, Russia’s death rate from injury and 
poisoning is currently over four times as high as Finland’s, the nation with 
the worst rate in the EU.  Russia’s violent death rate for men under 65 is 
nearly six times as high as Belgium’s, over nine times as high as Israel’s, 
and over a dozen times that of the United Kingdom.  As is well known, 
men are more likely than women to die violent deaths—but in a gruesome 
crossover, these death rates for Russian women are now higher than for 
most western European men.171 
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Environmental factors likely have contributed to the rise in mortality.  Russian 
industry, on average releases “toxic metals such as arsenic and lead into the air…several 
hundred, and sometimes several thousand, times that of industry” in the European Union.  
Also, Russia’s rivers and waterways, the primary source of drinking water for most of the 
population, have become polluted by high concentrations of phenols and petroleum 
products; levels have often “exceeded ambient water quality standards by a factor of two 
to ten times.”172  The drinking water available to about half of the population falls 
“below microbiologic and chemical standards for public health.”173  Cancer rates, 
generally linked to the level of carcinogens and pollutants in the environment, have risen 
some since 1990.  Despite concerns over environmental factors, they have not seemed to 
play as large a role as expected.  The collapse of many industries in the 1990s actually led  
to some environmental improvements in air and water quality, a time when death rates 
increased the fastest.174  The long-term costs of Russia’s environmental degradation, 
however, remain unclear. 
C. RESURGENCE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE: THE NEW AND THE OLD 
While the Russian population has experienced a surge in NCDs over the past 
three or four decades as part of the epidemiological transition, it now appears that the 
transition, at least to some degree, is shifting directions.175  This is illustrated by the 
recent increase in the prevalence of infectious diseases, both old and new.  Tuberculosis 
(TB) and Hepatitis B and C, once considered under control and treatable, have made an 
unquestionable and deadly return.  At the same time, the spread of HIV/AIDS throughout 
the Russian population is significant enough to potentially “cancel any prospective health 
progress in Russia over the coming generation.”176  Generally, the spread of these 
emerging infectious diseases has been limited to a high-risk segment of the population.  
The high-risk group consists of Russia’s prison population, the poor and homeless, drug 
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addicts, alcoholics, and sex workers; in other words, those who live in unhealthy 
conditions or choose to participate in unhealthy behaviors.  Recent trends, however, 
indicate that these diseases increasingly are being transmitted from the high-risk groups 
to “bridging groups,” typically through sexual intercourse.”177  The “bridging groups” 
then spread it through intimate contact, often sexual, to the general population.178  These 
diseases are particularly damaging because they have the potential to hit the working age 
cohort of the population the hardest. 
Tuberculosis infection most often occurs through “inhalation of droplet nuclei of 
the bronchial aerosol that contains mycobacterium discharged by” someone already 
infected.179  Tuberculosis requires a set of conditions in order to become endemic, such 
as weakened immune systems and damp, crowded living and working conditions; 
circumstances common to the high-risk segment of society.  Each year over 30,000 
Russians die from tuberculosis.180 The annual death toll from TB is 30 times greater than 
in the United States when measured as deaths per 100,000.   In 2001, the death rate in 
Russia from TB was 25.5 per 100 cases, up from 7.7 in 1985.  Mortality from TB has 
increased as drug-resistant strains of the disease have multiplied.  The scourge of TB, 
however, is particularly unsettling because, in most cases, it is treatable and should not 
result in death.  181 
Hepatitis B and C are also on the rise.  The virus, like HIV/AIDS is passed on 
through shared injection equipment and sexual transmission.  It is estimated that over 40 
percent of hepatitis cases are transmitted sexually, increasing the threat of exposure to the 
general population.  As of 1999, there were 43.3 cases of hepatitis B per 100,000 and 
19.31 per 100,000 of hepatitis C.  Both types have increased dramatically in prevalence 
since the 1990s.  Hepatitis is frequently fatal for those who contract it in Russia.   
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Treatments are generally expensive and often unavailable.  A few years ago there were 
only 1.3 million doses of vaccine “produced annually to meet a total demand of 13 to 14 
million doses.”182 
In 2005, the Russian Federation reported more than 313,000 official cases of HIV 
positive individuals.  Actual numbers, however, likely are much higher.  Reporting 
problems and strict laws against drug use prevent many carriers of HIV from being tested 
or registering with the government.  Experts put the actual number of cases of HIV/AIDS 
between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.183  The disease, while still largely contained within 
the high-risk segment of the population, is making the transition into the general 
population via the “bridging groups” which includes released prisoners, “sexual partners 
of drug users, females having sex with bisexual males, and clients of sex workers.”184  
Indications that HIV/AIDS is beginning to make the transition into the general population 
include the rate of transmission through heterosexual sex and the prevalence of the 
infection among women.   From 2000 to 2004 the number of newly registered HIV cases 
resulting from heterosexual transmission increased from 3 percent to 25 percent.  From 
2001 to 2004 the prevalence of HIV among registered females rose from 20 percent to 38 
percent.185  If HIV/AIDS is allowed to spread, unchecked, into the general population, 
Russia’s recent economic gains will be nullified and the current demographic crisis will 
worsen.  Some estimates indicate that, if allowed to follow present trends, Russia’s 
developing HIV/AIDS epidemic could reduce “GDP by 5 percent over the next 20 
years.”186 
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Injecting drug users (IDUs) have increased radically in number in Russia since the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan.  Viktor Cherkesov, Chairman of the Federal Service to 
Control the Trade in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances has suggested that 4,000,000 
people in Russia are drug users.  Other estimates put the overall number closer to 
6,500,000, with 1,800,000 considered drug dependent.  The effects have been 
devastating.  Over 70,000 deaths a year in Russia are attributed to drug overdose and fatal 
reactions.  The larger problem, however, stems from the repeated sharing of injection 
equipment, which provides a steady path of transmission for a number of deadly, 
infectious diseases.  Drug use, and the spread of infections, is also closely linked to 
prostitution.  It is significant that some estimates indicate “that one third of all drug users 
in Russia fund their habit primarily through prostitution,” increasing the risk of 
transmission within the high-risk group (IDUs) and into the general population through 
customers of sex workers.187  Based on current estimates, “between 1.01 percent and 2.04 
percent of the entire population of Russia is at an elevated risk of contracting the AIDS 
virus solely through high risk drug-related behavior.”188   
Prisons across Russia also provide a breeding ground for the spread of these 
diseases.  High-risk drug use (sharing of equipment) and sexual behavior (unprotected 
sex between men) are common, each contributing the spread of HIV/AIDS, TB and 
hepatitis B and C.  The Health Ministry stated that “one-third of prisoners suffer from 
mental conditions, 26,000 have syphilis, 1,500 have hepatitis, and 74,000 have 
tuberculosis.”189  The Ministry also indicated that 36,000 prisoners have HIV and nearly 
all of them regularly use narcotics.190  As over 300,000 former prisoners are released 
back into society annually, the risk of these infections spreading to the general population 
is significant.191   
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D. REPERCUSSIONS OF A LIMITED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
The current healthcare system in Russia is unable to meet the medical needs of 
large portions of the population, effectively allowing the nation’s health capital to ebb 
away.  Significant numbers of deaths each year in Russia are avoidable with proper 
medical care.192  Additionally, Russia’s healthcare system is not organized to deal with 
the major health issues facing the country.  Russia inherited a healthcare system beset by 
structural deficiencies and unprepared to deal with the country’s epidemiological 
transition.  The current system is forced to operate with outdated and broken equipment, 
employing ineffective medical practices long discarded by the West.193  
Access to effective healthcare, today, in the Russian Federation is limited to those 
who can afford new privatized medical facilities or to those with enough money or 
resources to bribe state doctors and hospitals.  The vast majority of Russians continue to 
rely on the ineffective state healthcare system.  They are forced to wait long periods of 
time for substandard care.194  The healthcare system has failed to address the medical 
needs of the population despite an increase of over 31,000 medical doctors between 1992 
and 2004, and an increase of 5.5 doctors per 10,000 of the population.195  Overwhelmed 
by the onslaught of CVDs and other NCDs, the healthcare system is no longer able to 
contain the spread of infectious diseases.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Health capital in Russia is in steep decline.  At present, there is no evidence that 
current trends will slow or be reversed in the near future.  The economic costs of 
declining health capital have the potential to destabilize the country and the region.196  It 
will become more difficult to change these trends the longer they persist.  The 
institutional, political, and cultural causes of declining health capital will only become 
more ingrained.  Both the Soviet and Russian governments proved incapable or unwilling 
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to formulate and execute effective policies aimed at improving the country’s health 
capital.  The next chapter will detail a number of failed policies attempted by the Soviet 



























IV. POLICY AND HEALTH CAPITAL 
Among developed nations, the majority of governments play an active and 
influential role in the formation and implementation of health policy.  While the degree 
of involvement varies, most governments are involved in a few key areas, such as, 
regulations and standards, research and development, and disease control.  Within these 
areas alone, government policy has the potential to affect directly the level of health 
capital within a nation.  Effective and attainable standards, set and enforced by the 
government, can guarantee a high quality of care for the population.  Sufficient 
government funding for research and disease control can insure the development of future 
capabilities and the protection of public health from dangerous epidemics.  In essence, 
effective government policy can improve the overall level of health capital.  On the other 
hand, poor policy and/or poor implementation of policy can negatively impact health 
capital. 
Government health policy, in the case of Russia, is germane to the continuing 
decline in health capital.  Throughout the developed world, political debates rage over the 
desired extent of government involvement in health care.  It is common among the 
developed nations for the private sector to play a significant, if not primary role, in 
health.  Within the Russian Federation, as was the case in the Soviet Union, public health 
is the primary responsibility of the government.  As stated in Article 41 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation: 
Everyone shall have the right to health protection and medical care.  
Medical care in State and municipal health institutions shall be rendered to 
citizens free of charge at the expense of the appropriate budget, insurance 
premiums and other proceeds. 
In the Russian Federation federal programmes for the protection and 
improvement of the public health shall be financed, measures shall be 
taken to develop State, municipal and private healthcare systems…197 
Health capital in Russia is in serious decline.  Trends do not indicate any 
imminent or meaningful reversals in the current crisis.  It appears, therefore, that the 
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policies and programs of the Russian Federation have failed to “protect” or “improve” 
public health.  This chapter will review specific government policies affecting the 
healthcare system and population change.  Due to the continuity between policies of the 
Soviet and Russian governments, both periods will be explored. 
A. HEALTHCARE 
  Health capital is affected by the ability of the existing healthcare system to 
preserve health.  In and of itself, the quality and availability of healthcare is not a 
measurement of health capital, but of the ability to protect health capital.  In Russia, 
healthcare is the primary interface between the government and public health.  Since 
before Soviet times, the government has been provider and guarantor of healthcare to the 
Russian people.  Simply put, Russian healthcare is the product of government policy.  
Generally, government’s greatest impact on public health is through healthcare policy.  A 
close look at the functioning of healthcare, therefore, can provide an excellent window 
into the affect of government policy on health capital. 
1. Soviet Healthcare Policies: Lasting Precedents 
The current system of healthcare in Russia is the product of decades of Soviet 
policy.  It is, therefore, important to understand Soviet policy decisions that continue to 
affect healthcare in Russia today.  The constitutional guarantees of healthcare included in 
the present Constitution of the Russian Federation are reiterations of earlier guarantees 
offered in the 1936 and 1977 Constitutions of the Soviet Union.198  Under the model 
developed by Nikolai Semashko, Soviet healthcare fell completely under the direction 
and funding of the state.  The Semashko Model was based on the concepts of 
“government responsibility for health, universal access to free services [and] a 
preventative approach to ‘social diseases.’”199  The result was a centralized health  
system intended to provide universal and free healthcare.   As Boris Rozenfeld  
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points out,  the ultimate consequence was a healthcare system “fully dependent  
on  the  state  and  its  governing  bodies.”200 
To begin with, the Soviet guarantee of total health coverage put an enormous 
responsibility on a government healthcare system limited by resource and structural 
deficiencies.  The benefits package legally required from the state was very extensive.  
As the Soviet governments failed to adequately fund a healthcare system capable of 
providing the promised benefits, two consequences emerged.  First, medical care 
effectively was rationed.  Hospitals, doctors, and health officials were forced to rely on 
unofficial wait lists and bribes to ration the provision of medical care to the 
population.201  Second, complete reliance on the government for healthcare removed any 
safety net in the case of failed policies.  The population lacked any incentive to assume 
responsibility for public health when the government was legally required to provide all 
necessary care free of charge.  The problem is that when the state failed to provide 
adequate care, no one stepped in to fill the void. 
Next, the Soviet healthcare system was organized to increase the life expectancy 
of the Russian population by eradicating infectious diseases.  The result was a system of 
mass public screenings, hospitals with large bed capacities, and an inordinate number of 
doctors relative to the population.  In order to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, 
infected patients discovered during screenings were hospitalized for extended stays.  
Little attention was given to education and more cost effective methods of prevention.  
As a consequence, the Soviet healthcare system was unprepared for the epidemiological 
transition from infectious diseases to non-communicable diseases (NCDs).  Since NCDs 
are largely the result of behavioral choices and environmental factors, hospitalization and 
medicinal care cannot prevent new cases.   
The Soviet government, despite an awareness of the new emerging 
epidemiological reality, refused to adjust healthcare policy accordingly.  Rather than 
implement effective reforms, which likely would have required additional funding, the 
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government “chose to suppress data and to create yet more beds.”202  Health and 
government officials emphasized “quantitative measures and indices,” (i.e., number of 
hospital beds and doctors), over qualitative measurements of health, (i.e., mortality rates, 
disease prevalence, and life expectancy).203  The continuation of the status quo seriously 
undermined the capability of the healthcare system to help the population with the rise in 
NCDs, effectively boosting the mortality rate over the long-term.   
Today, the Russian healthcare system continues to suffer from Soviet healthcare 
policies.  Doctors and patients continue to operate in a system dominated by rationing 
and bribery.  Medical care remains the responsibility of the state, with little motivation 
for the population to take steps to insure their needs are provided.  Surprisingly little has 
changed. 
A strong focus remains both on medicinal solutions to NCDs and on quantitative 
measurements of government health service.  As Ellie Tragakes and Suszy Lessof write 
in their review of Russia’s healthcare system: 
The consequences of the Soviet preoccupations can still be seen in the 
post-Soviet health system.  The facilities for rehabilitation remain, as does 
a marked over-provision of beds.  The tendency to carry out mass 
screening has also persisted with little thought as to how any detected 
needs will be met.204 
A quick look at the data provided by Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service provides 
evidence of the continued importance of quantitative measures.  The report titled “Main 
Indicators of Public Health” provides data on the overall number of physicians and 
hospital beds, both in absolute terms and relative to the population.  Between 1992 and 
2004 the total number of doctors in the Russian Federation has risen by 51,000, or from 
42.9 doctors per 100,000 of the population in 1992 to 48.4 doctors per 100,000 in 
2004.205  Over the same period, average male life expectancy at birth fell from 62 to 58.9 
years and the Russian population fell by nearly 4 percent.   
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 Along with the institutional inertia of Russia’s inherited healthcare system, Soviet 
attitudes and policies toward the medical profession continue to affect the overall quality 
of healthcare today.  Within the Soviet system, doctors and nurses were considered “part 
of the non-productive sector of society and consequently disfavored [in] their pay and 
conditions.”206  Throughout the latter part of the Soviet period, doctors earned between 
75 and 90 percent of the average wage of an industrial worker, just slightly more than 
nurses.207  As late as 2003, a primary care physician at public hospital in Russia earned 
approximately $50 per month.  As in Soviet times, salaries for those in the medical 
profession are set by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health.208  
 One consequence of such low salaries is a lack of incentive for doctors and nurses 
to perform well or to find innovative ways to take care of patients.  Doctors, demoralized 
by low pay, are prone to limit their level of commitment to work and see as few patients 
as possible.  Also, low salaries that are capped by law make it difficult for management to 
control doctors through financial incentives or punishments.209  Another consequence of 
low wages, combined with limited and outdated equipment, is the proliferation of under-
the-table payments for medical care and supplies.  It is estimated that in 2002 
approximately $600 million, or 7-10 percent of all health expenditures, was paid in bribes 
to doctors and health officials for medical care.  As mentioned, this often leaves the 
poorer segment of the population, de facto, without healthcare.210 
 Finally, the state imposed isolation of the Soviet Union not only cut off the 
country from political ideas and innovations, but also from valuable technologies and 
research in the medical field.  Doctors and hospitals in the Soviet Union were forced to 
employ “ineffective treatments that had either never been adopted or had long been 
abandoned in the West.”211  As a result mortality rates for many ailments, curable and 
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treatable in the West, remained high in the Soviet Union.  Today, Russia continues to 
suffer from outdated equipment, practices, and training.  Limited resources and 
bureaucratic inertia continue to prevent the Russian healthcare system from making 
significant, life-saving and life-enhancing improvements. 
2. Russian Healthcare: Failed Attempts at Reform 
Since the collapse of Communism in 1991, the government of the Russian 
Federation has made numerous attempts to reform the national healthcare system.  Within 
the first decade of its existence, the government of the Russian Federation had printed 
more than 98 laws, decrees, orders, decisions and concepts regarding public health.212  
For the most part, these policies have failed to achieve the desired results.  The major 
cause has been, and continues to be, inadequate funding.  As indicated in the Table 4 and 
Table 5, government funding did not increase substantially throughout the 1990s and 
Russia continues to lag behind other developed nations in terms of health care funding 
and spending. For the purposes of this research, two specific policy concepts will be 
explored: the attempt by the government to introduce a new method of healthcare 
financing through insurance programs and the decentralization of healthcare. 
As Russia entered the new era of in the 1990s, the government funded healthcare 
system was unprepared to participate in a market economy.  The ability of the 
government to fund healthcare at levels required to maintain even the Soviet standard of 
care “became untenable” as the tax base collapsed amid economic chaos.213  The 
reduction in funding not only slowed the growth and development of the healthcare 
system, in some cases it also reversed previous progress.214  In 1991, health insurance 
legislation was introduced to augment the government’s anemic funding of healthcare.    
The goal behind the insurance legislation was “to provide new sources of non-budget 
financing” while continuing “to provide universal access and comprehensive coverage for 
the population.”215  Funding for the insurance was to be paid in part by employers and 
local governments.   
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To date, with the exception of success in a few geographic areas, insurance 
reform has not significantly increased the availability and quality of healthcare services.  
One reason for its very limited success is that insurance, by and large, has not increased 
the overall funding available for healthcare.  While the plan called for government 
funding to remain constant, local governments cut their expenditures in expectation of 
insurance payments. Also, a considerable number of Russia’s regions have not even 
begun to implement insurance reforms.  Ambiguity in the legislation has contributed to 
disparate interpretations of the responsibilities of the various parties.  The overriding 
result is that no one person or institution in the national or regional governments has 
accepted responsibility for making the insurance program work.216   
Another important factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the insurance 
legislation has been opposition from the bureaucracy.  Largely opposed by the Ministries 
of Health and Finance, the entire insurance program has suffered as a result of 
bureaucratic infighting and malfeasance on the part of national and local officials.  For 
example, in a number of regions “local authorities raided the insurance funds and used 
the illegally acquired money to finance non-health related products such as housing and 
construction.”217  While bureaucratic opposition has lessened since the late 1990s, a 
number of hazardous precedents were set and successful implementation of the program 
has been delayed.  Healthcare continues to be under-funded. 
 
Table 4.   Trends in Healthcare Expenditure in the Russian Federation, 1994-2002218 
Total Expenditure on Health Care 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2002 
Annual Healthcare Expenditures, US$ 
PPP, billion 
29.2 23.8 24.5 29.2 26.2 27.2 NA 
Share of GDP (%) 4.4 4.0 4.1 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.6 
Public as share of total expenditure on 
health care (%) 
88.9 81.7 79.2 75.3 67.7 65.5 59.0 
In terms of per capita spending on healthcare, Russia lags behind several other developed 
nations but is ahead of some neighboring countries. 
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Table 5.   Healthcare Expenditure and Health Indicators Comparison, 2002-2003219 
Country Public 
Expenditures 




(% of GDP, 
2002) 











Russian Federation 3.5 2.7 535 65 17 
United States 6.6 8.0 5,274 77 7 
Germany 8.6 2.3 2,817 79 4 
Poland 4.4 1.7 657 75 7 
China 2.0 3.8 261 71 26 
Ukraine 3.3 1.4 210 68 14 
Kazakhstan 1.9 1.6 261 65 63 
 Decentralization has been another key feature of healthcare policy reform in the 
Russian Federation since the early 1990s.  This concept is particularly confusing as many 
scholars disagree on the nature of Soviet and Russian healthcare.  Most agree that the 
institutional organization of healthcare in Russia today has a negative impact on the 
quality and availability of services provided.  Eduardo Gomez, based on his historical 
analysis, argues that the Russian population always has suffered from the effects of a 
decentralized healthcare system.220  On the other hand, Celeste Wallander, claims that 
Russia’s present healthcare system, like its Soviet predecessor, is too centralized and, 
therefore, is subject to “duplication and compartmentalization of policy and government 
services.”221  Ellie Tragakes and Suszy Lessof, in their work for the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, however, point to a significant 
decentralization of the healthcare system since the collapse of the Soviet Union.222  
Centralized control of the healthcare system, however, was agreed upon during the Fifth 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918.223  Whatever the level of centralization during 
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the Soviet era, Russia’s current healthcare system is significantly decentralized and 
exhibits a number of negative consequences as a result. 
Decentralization has shifted primary responsibility for the provision of healthcare 
to the regions and municipalities, allowing the national government to avoid blame for 
any resulting shortcomings.  Absent extensive financial assistance from the national 
government, regional institutions are forced to fund healthcare out of their local budgets.  
This has increased inequalities in the availability and quality of healthcare between the 
regions due to geographically diverse economic performance. As the regions have 
assumed control of healthcare, the Ministry of Health has necessarily lost a hefty portion 
of its authority to set and implement national health policy.  Also, the ability to enforce 
national regulations and standards is seriously diminished. 
The lack of an effective central authority has contributed to ineffective planning 
and poor use of limited capital and resources.  It has become common for the regions, 
absent vertical direction or horizontal cooperation with neighboring regions, to create 
completely independent and “sovereign” healthcare institutions.224  As a result, the 
supply of medical care is often created by local officials outside of market considerations 
for demand.  Many expensive services are duplicated in close geographic proximity 
simply because local officials are unwilling to work with one another or with the national 
government in terms of planning.  Resources are wasted and serious medical needs go 
unfulfilled.225 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS: POLICIES AND CONSEQUENCES 
President Vladimir Putin stated the following in his May 2006 annual address to 
the Federal Assembly: 
You know that our country’s population is declining by an average of 
almost 700,000 people a year.  We have raised the issue on many 
occasions but have for the most part done very little to address it.  
Resolving this problem requires us to take the following steps.  First, we 
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need to lower the death rate.  Second, we need an effective migration 
policy.  And third, we need to increase the birth rate.226 
Government policy is capable of affecting the various measures of health capital directly.  
This section will examine both Soviet and Russian efforts to bolster the national 
population.  First, policies aimed at increasing the birthrate will be explored.  Second, it 
will look at the effect of government alcohol policies on mortality.   Third, it will 
scrutinize the special case of government efforts to deal with Russia’s emerging 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
1. Fertility Rate: Pronatalist Policies and Contraception 
Current efforts by the Russian government to encourage higher birthrates are not 
unique.  Similar policies have been pursued by the Soviet Union and other governments 
in the past.  Population size has been linked to the ideas of national greatness and power.  
In the twentieth century, a large population was perceived as a prerequisite of 
industrialization and modernization.227  For the Soviet Union, and Stalin in particular, 
industrialization was the ultimate state objective.  Increasing the size and health of the 
population, therefore, became imperative.  In terms of Soviet ideology, low birthrates 
“were not typical of socialism.”228 
The Soviet Union, like its West European counterparts, openly pursued pronatalist 
policies, using both material benefits and official recognition as incentives to encourage 
women to have more children.  Shortly after coming to power, the Communist Party 
formalized its pronatalist policies by establishing a Department of Maternal and Infant 
Welfare.  This new department, in order to encourage women to have children, “created a 
large number of maternity homes, nurseries, milk kitchens, and pediatric clinics.”229  
Potential mothers were also offered cash bonuses for having more than six children.  
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Under Stalin, women with seven or more children received the praise of the Soviet Union 
and were presented with Medals of Maternal Glory.230 
Repressive measures were also employed by the Soviet government to push the 
birthrate higher.  Laws were enacted to encourage marriage and limit opportunities for 
divorce.  Perhaps the greatest attempt to force the population to cooperate with state 
objectives occurred in the sphere of contraception.  The Soviet desire for a large 
workforce to fuel industrialization and the traditional influence of the Russian Orthodox 
Church toward families combined to create a negative attitude toward contraception 
among those in political power.  As a result, contraceptive options in the Soviet Union, 
especially prior to the 1970s and 1980s, were severely limited.  Absent any other reliable 
options, Russian and Soviet women turned to abortion as the primary means of birth 
control.  Any attempts by the Soviet government to limit or criminalize abortion did little 
to decrease the actual number of procedures.  Without legal options, women turned to 
illegal abortions, which often resulted in health complications or death.  In the end, the 
Soviet Union came to accept abortion as the accepted means of birth control while 
attempting to limit access to all other options.  The long-term results of this decision were 
detailed in the previous chapter.231 
Soviet pronatalist policies ultimately failed in their goal.  National birthrates did 
increase temporarily between 1935 and 1937, but were in decline again by 1938.  The 
policies failed for a number of reasons.  The cost of providing all the promised benefits to 
Soviet mothers for any period of time was prohibitive.  The bulk of Soviet financial and 
capital resources went directly into the industrialization effort, not into social programs.  
Also, the very process of industrialization and urbanization suppressed the birthrate.  
Women, with the opportunity (or obligation) to work and receive an education, had less 
incentive to focus their efforts on the traditional role of motherhood.  The demands of a 
modern society did not allow enough time or energy needed to devote to raising a large 
family.  Improved healthcare increased life expectancy and lowered the infant mortality 
rate, which had been reasons for having more children.  Russia, and the Soviet Union, 
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underwent the same basic demographic transition which occurred in other developed 
nations.  Birthrates decreased and life expectancy increased.232   
Early Soviet policies regarding contraception had a lasting impact on the Russian 
society.  Changes, however, have occurred.  Since the 1990s, abortion rates have fallen as 
other forms of contraception have become available.  Couples are no longer forced to 
choose between ineffective, disagreeable contraceptive products made according to old 
Soviet standards.233  Since 1988, contraceptive use has doubled among Russian women, 
leading to a reduced reliance on abortion.  While increased reliance on contraceptives has 
not appreciably added to the birth rate, it has helped reduce the likelihood of sterility and 
death by decreasing the number of abortions and slowing the spread of STIs.  The 
positive health benefits of improved contraceptives, however, are effective only for those 
Russians able to afford them and willing to use them. 
For four years during the 1990s, the Russian government “funded family planning 
clinics that distributed free contraceptives and provided medical care.”234  The clinics 
also provided the public information on a number of reproductive issues, such as safe sex, 
abortion, and general contraceptive alternatives.235  The Russian Duma, with a significant 
number of Communist ministers and under pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church, 
cut off federal funding for the program in 1997.  Concern over the falling birth rate cast 
official support of birth control in contradictory terms.236  In 2003, the Health Ministry 
instituted new guidelines to limit a woman’s access to abortion in an effort to reduce the 
negative health and fertility repercussions linked to the procedure.  A number of medical 
experts suggest that closure of the clinics combined with a restriction on abortions may 
only worsen the problem.  Without access to contraceptives or knowledge of reproductive 
issues, STIs will continue to spread.  Women with unwanted pregnancies may turn to the                                                  
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even more dangerous option of illegal abortions.237  The new restrictions have not 
prevented the vast majority of abortions performed in Russia, but between 1992 and 2001 
the rate of legal abortions did fall by around 45 percent.238 
Today, President Putin is once again pushing pronatalist policies, despite a history 
of failure in Russia’s past.  In his annual address in 2006, he stated: 
I propose a programme to encourage childbirth.  In particular, I propose 
measures to support young families and support women who decide to 
give birth and raise children.  Our aim should be at the least to encourage 
families to have a second child…The programme to encourage childbirth 
should include a whole series of administrative, financial and social 
support measures for young families.239 
Current proposals call for a payment of 250,000 rubles, or almost $9,500 to women who 
have a second child.240  This is a significant amount considering that the GDP per capita 
in Russia is approximately $9,200.241  It is important to note, however, that each of the 
conditions which prevented Soviet pronatalist policies from succeeding essentially 
remains.  It remains to be seen whether or not the Russian government will be willing to 
fully fund the benefits necessary to have a meaningful affect on the birthrate.  Further, no 
developed country has reversed the demographic transition completely.  It is doubtful that 
the Russian government will be able to convince Russian women to dedicate themselves 
to motherhood.  Today, most men and women in Russia, and, for that matter, around the 
world, see smaller families as more beneficial.  From an economic standpoint, life in 
Russia is better than it was eight to nine years ago, but the future remains uncertain.  
Putin’s attempts to increase the birthrate most likely will not meet with any lasting 
success.  It is interesting to compare the differences between the situation faced by both 
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Stalin and Putin.  Stalin rewarded and recognized mothers with more than six children.  
Putin is willing to disperse almost $10,000 to Russian women just to have a second child. 
2. Mortality Rate: Alcohol 
Alcohol consumption is a major contributor to Russia’s skyrocketing death rate, 
particularly among working age males.  State policy, particularly during the Soviet era, 
has done little to limit the impact of alcohol consumption on the health of the population.  
Disagreements over government policy toward alcohol arose early in Soviet history.  
Many members of the Communist Party considered alcohol consumption and its side 
effects as anti-Socialist.  There was even a prohibition of alcohol sales in the Soviet 
Union until 1919.  By the mid-1920s, however, it was clear that prohibition did not 
significantly reduce alcohol consumption.  The population would simply distill their own 
homebrews, which were often deadly.242   
Short on revenue and unable to control the population’s desire for alcohol, the 
Party reverted to the tsarist practice of state alcohol sales.  In terms of revenue, it proved 
to be a windfall for the state.  According to Daniel Tarschys: 
By 1965 turnover taxes on alcohol constituted about 11.5% of all 
government revenues, and after a slight decline in the 1970s it was again 
estimated to reach 12-13% in 1982…In 1979 23 billion rubles were paid 
in income tax and some 65 billion rubles in turnover taxes on consumer 
goods.  Of the latter, alcoholic beverages accounted for 25.4 billion rubles.  
Indirect taxes on alcohol thus yielded more than all income.243 
The Soviet government became dependent on alcohol sales to fund the government.  In 
1988 Gorbachev suggested that without oil and alcohol sales the Soviet economy would 
have been in recession for over 20 years.244   
 Despite the state dependence on alcohol revenues, there was recognition of the 
high social and economic costs incurred from prolific alcohol consumption.  Economic 
data from the 1970s suggests that social cost of alcohol consumption was between seven 
and nine percent of the GDP.  One estimate suggested that the total cost of alcohol abuse 
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“might [have been] four times as high as the government revenue from alcohol.”245  In a 
fruitless effort to reduce public alcohol consumption, the Soviet government would often 
raise prices of alcohol.  The consistent result was an increase in the production and 
consumption of the Russian version of moonshine, samogon, which only caused more 
health and social problems.  The government would subsequently lower prices.246  The 
Soviet government, conflicted by its need for revenues and the increasing cost of alcohol 
consumption, failed to make any effective policy decisions.  Alcohol consumption and 
deaths caused by alcohol consumption rose steadily from the 1950s through the 1970s.247 
 Real change came in the 1985 with the radical anti-alcohol campaign of Mikhail 
Gorbachev.  The ultimate goal of the campaign was “total sobriety.”248  Alcohol sales 
were limited by law and the minimum age for purchasing alcohol was raised to 21 years.  
In terms of immediate quantifiable measurements, i.e. alcohol sales and consumption, the 
results of the policy were mixed.  Official alcohol sales dropped a precipitous 63 percent.  
Alcohol consumption, however, only fell by 26 percent. The production and consumption 
of illegal moonshine, or samogon, doubled in the same period.249  One side effect of the 
anti-alcohol campaign was a widespread shortage of sugar, a primary ingredient of 
moonshine, throughout 1988.250  Within three years, however, the policy was repealed.  
The change proved to be too much for a society who spent on average 10 to 15 percent of 
their income on alcoholic beverages.  In the end, the alcohol lobby succeeded in ending 
Gorbachev’s restrictive policies.251 
Despite its ultimate failure, Gorbachev’s radical anti-alcohol policy did appear to 
have a perceptible impact on health capital.  Male life expectancy, at only 62.3 years in 
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1981, rose to 65.1 years in 1987.  Also, the newly diagnosed cases of alcoholism and 
related illnesses dropped over the same period from 206 to 154 per 100,000 of the 
population.252  No other potential explanations or changes in Russian society present 
themselves as an answer to such a rapid improvement in health.  The improvements, 
however, were short lived.  Once the legislation was repealed, alcohol consumption 
increased and life expectancies began to drop.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the privatization of the Russia’s 
alcohol industry.  The state effectively relinquished control of alcohol sales.  While 
vodka sales had accounted approximately 30 percent of government revenues during the 
Soviet Union, by 1998 it only provided 5 percent.  While alcohol sales account for a 
much smaller percentage of government revenue, they are actually taxed quite high.  As a 
result, the production of illegal alcohol remains prevalent.253  Today the Russian 
government seems uninterested in alcohol policy in general.  Outside of tax collection, 
the administrations of both Yeltsin and Putin have taken hands off approach, allowing 
market forces, as they exist in Russia, to control the alcohol industry.  As previously 
indicated alcohol consumption remains a major cause of declining health capital.   
3. HIV/AIDS Policy: A Special Case 
In the three decades since its initial appearance, the human immunodeficiency 
virus has infected more than 40 million people.  Today, it is the fourth leading cause of 
death worldwide.  More than three million people died as a result of HIV infection in 
2004.  Due to the policy decisions and attitudes of both the Soviet and Russian 
governments, the Russian population is at risk of facing a full-blown HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  The first diagnosis of HIV infection in Russia occurred in 1987.  Throughout 
the 1990s the disease spread primarily among high risk groups, i.e. drug users, prisoners, 
homosexuals, and sex workers. 254  As a result, the Soviet and Russian governments have 
tended to view the disease as a behavioral problem confined to a small section of the                                                  
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population.  Help for combating the disease, therefore, has been slow and inadequate.  
Also, due to the social stigmas generally associated with the spread of the virus, 
screening for the disease has proven ineffective. 
Russian policy, in a number of specific ways, has fallen short in its attempt to 
slow the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus and to treat those afflicted.  First, the 
decentralization of Russian healthcare has resulted in a fragmented approach to 
combating the disease.  At the federal level alone, at least four different organizations are 
responsible for dealing with HIV/AIDS.  The lack of coordination between these 
organizations and regional institutions has confused efforts and made it difficult to 
determine who is responsible for implementing policies, laws and programs.  Regions 
have been free to develop and fund independent methods of dealing with the epidemic.  
As a result, some regions have implemented more effective policies and experienced 
positive policy results; most have not.255 
Second, the level of government funding “is completely inadequate given the 
scale of the Russian epidemic.”256  Insufficient government funding has severely limited 
the availability of treatment to those afflicted.  The standard treatment for HIV infection, 
anti-retroviral (ARV) medicine, is very expensive.  In the United States, the average cost 
for treatment for one person for an entire year was $10,000 in 2004.  Special programs 
and international agreements exist to lower the cost to less than $1,000 under certain 
circumstances.  The value of ARV to those infected can be huge.  With treatment an 
infected individual can expect to live for a number of years in relatively good health.  
Without the treatment, an HIV-positive individual usually only has five years to live.  
While the Russian government has increased funding significantly over the past decade, 
it remains insufficient event to treat those already affected, much less to fund programs 
aimed at preventing the spread of the disease.257   
In 2003 and 2004, federal funding for combating HIV/AIDS was about $12 
million per year with the regional and local governments contributing another $10 to $15 
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million.  Of the 300,000 people officially registered as HIV-positive approximately 2,000 
of them received ARV treatment.  To treat every infected individual at the cost of just 
$1,000 per person would require at least $300 million.  Just to treat even 60,000 infected 
individuals, a number included in a recent funding proposal by the Russian government, 
would cost $60 million, or twice what the Russian government, national and regional 
budgets combined, is spending now.  Currently, the Moscow AIDS Center, pays the 
standard $10,000 fee for each round of ARV treatment.  It is very unlikely that the 
Russian government will commit the additional funding required to treat a significantly 
greater number of individuals.  This does not imply, however, that the Russian 
government does not have the money.  As Celeste Wallander points out, in 2004 the 
Russian government paid off over $2 billion “in old debts to the world’s wealthiest 
countries, principally Germany, Italy, and the United States.”258 
Third, it has been difficult for the Russian government to collect accurate data on 
the scope of the epidemic.  Many of Russia’s laws regarding HIV/AIDS and the 
behaviors which contribute to its spread are punitive in nature, dissuading those who may 
be infected from voluntarily submitting to screening and reporting procedures.  By law, 
homosexuals are required to submit to HIV testing.  Those who do not comply are often 
imprisoned.  Drug users, for legal reasons, are also reluctant to submit to testing.  The law 
does not require that positive test results remain confidential.  Further, individuals who 
test positive are often subjected to mandatory treatment.259  As a consequence, the 
official number of registered cases of HIV/AIDS is considerably less than the actual 
amount.  Official figures put the number of HIV-positive individuals at just over 300,000.  
Estimates put the actual number between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.260  The lower official 
numbers allow the government to downplay the severity of the problem and justify the 
government’s limited response as being adequate. 
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Russia’s inability to confront the looming HIV/AIDS crisis in an organized and 
efficient manner likely will have devastating consequences.  As HIV/AIDS makes the 
transition from the high-risk population into the general society, Russia’s besieged 
healthcare system will be overwhelmed.  Past and current policies have failed to slow the 
spread of the disease.  Between 2000 and 2004 the rate of heterosexual transmission rose 
from 3 percent of newly registered cases to 25 percent.  The rate of heterosexual 
transmission and the prevalence among women is likely to increase for the foreseeable 
future.  A widespread HIV/AIDS epidemic among Russia’s population would further 
decimate a society already beset by falling standards of living.  The impact on the 
country’s health capital, and the social cost of dealing with the disease, would wreak 
havoc on the economy.  The strong economic performance since 2000 likely would be 
reversed, throwing the country back into recession and instability.261  Sarah Grisin and 
Celeste Wallander summarized the threat of continued Russian ineptness regarding 
HIV/AIDS as follows: 
The Russian government does not like to be warned of the fact that it is 
following the path of Africa’s AIDS crisis, but the trend is indisputable 
and proven by rising numbers of infected, especially those outside the now 
recognized at-risk groups…Russia is vulnerable to an exploding AIDS 
crisis not merely because of the biology of the disease, but because of the 
weakness of its state and social infrastructure…HIV/AIDS is less 
forgiving than war or depression, which devastate a society for only years.  
If Russia does not confront the HIV/AIDS crisis, it will face a future 
against a threat that kills on a generational scale.262 
C. CONCLUSION 
Healthcare in the Russian Federation remains in serious trouble.  Despite efforts 
to fix the system bequeathed to it, the current healthcare system “is strikingly reminiscent 
of the Soviet model.”263  Attempts to better fund the healthcare system through insurance 
legislation has met with resistance from the national bureaucracy and the refusal of local 
governments to adequately fund their portion of the program.  At the same time, 
decentralization of healthcare administration has created a confusing amalgam of                                                  
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institutions.  The national government is unwilling or unable to ensure adequate standards 
of healthcare.  Resources are wasted as regional and local officials attempt to develop 
their own, independent healthcare systems with inadequate resources.  In the resulting 
chaos, the welfare of the population seems secondary to internal political struggles and 
attempts to avoid responsibility.  Without reliable and available healthcare, Russia’s level 
of health capital will continue to decline.  People in need of help often will receive 
substandard care or no care at all.  Health problems will continue to be ignored by those 
afflicted, creating greater problems for the future. 
Past policies intended to encourage population growth have failed even to slow 
long-term decline.  Current efforts at pronatalist policies will likely yield minimal results.  
Increased economic and political stability may produce a slight increase in Russia’s 
lackluster fertility rate.  It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the fertility will 
increase sufficiently to reverse the current trend of population decline. Efforts to 
encourage birth through limitation of contraceptives have failed.  At the same time, 
government attempts to lower Russia’s soaring mortality rate continue to be ineffective.  
Russia faces two key health epidemics: increasing rates of non-communicable diseases, 
(primarily in the form of cardiovascular disease), and a number of infectious diseases, 
(such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis, syphilis, and other sexually transmitted 
infections).  Unwillingness on the part of the government to address the root behavioral 
causes of these epidemics, particularly in a humane way, likely will only further 
contribute to the crisis.  Alcohol consumption and the spread of HIV/AIDS will retain 
central roles in the determination of Russia’s health capital for years to come. 
Despite attempts at reform, government policies aimed at affecting health in 
Russia have remained consistent since the Soviet period.  In large measure, they have 
consistently failed to provide a safety net for the population.  Health capital has declined 
in Russia over the past three or four decades.  Current demographic trends are proving 
tremendously difficult to reverse or even to slow down.  This chapter is not a 
comprehensive review of all government policies aimed at improving health capital in 
Russia.  It is, however, essentially representative of what the Russian government has 
attempted and achieved.  Now, it is necessary to determine what best explains this 
continuity of policy malfunction in Russia.  Why has government policy consistently 
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failed to provide the population with reliable and available healthcare?  Why has the 
government consistently exhibited an unwillingness or inability to protect the nation’s 
health capital?  If there are answers to these questions, then it is also worthwhile to ask 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Russia’s health capital has declined steadily since the 1960s.  This thesis has 
sought to understand the scope of Russia’s health capital crisis and the forces that have 
produced it.  Economic and political chaos, have certainly contributed to the general 
demise in health and standard of living.  Government policy, however, has played a 
significant role in the structure of Russia’s healthcare and bureaucratic institutions.  
Additionally, where the Russian population relies on the state for social welfare, 
government ineptitude has been especially devastating.   
The consistent failure of the government to develop and implement policies 
capable of reversing the nation’s negative health trends is troubling.  What explains this 
consistency?  Why have issues of health and social welfare, factors which affect the 
quality and level of health capital, been allowed to deteriorate to the point that solutions 
seem out of reach?  Furthermore, what can be done to overcome persistent government 
failure and ensure the creation and execution of policies capable of rectifying the current 
health capital crisis? 
This chapter will attempt to answer these questions. It will summarize what 
appear to be the primary factors contributing to the stasis observed in government health 
policy and society’s unwillingness to demand effective change from the state.  
Additionally, it will offer a few limited policy recommendations for improving Russia’s 
health capital. 
A. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
1. Political Culture and Health Capital 
State-society relations in Russia persistently have hindered government health 
policy.  Russia’s dominant paternalistic political culture seems to account for most of the 
stasis in government health policy.  While Russia’s political history does suggest the 
existence of a democratic-based political sub-culture, thus far, it has failed to transform 
state-society relations significantly.  As indicated in Chapters Two and Four, the Soviet 
and Russian governments have had a relatively free hand in devising and executing 
government policy without accountability to the population.  In turn, the cry for greater 
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political participation from the population at large has been muted throughout the 
decades.  Recent decisions by the Putin administration indicate a strengthening of this 
paternalistic state-society relationship.264   
The negative impact of Russia’s dominant political culture on health capital has 
been intensified by the powerful and persistent influence of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.  Throughout history the Russian and Soviet bureaucracies have proven 
proficient at manipulating government policy and foiling needed attempts at reform.  In 
his attempt to restore political and economic order in Russia, President Putin has 
succeeded in unleashing the power and sway of bureaucratic authoritarianism once again.  
As Lilia Shevstova wrote: 
Putin’s Russia followed the path toward bureaucratic order—through 
reliance on the apparat, administrative methods, subordination, loyalty, 
and instructions from above.  This order could be yet another illusion: 
Everything seems to work, commands are given, and subordinates report.  
But the problems are merely pushed more deeply away and with time 
become explosive.265   
Within the statist type of political system taking shape in Russia today, the president may 
be free to decide what should happen; increasingly it is the bureaucracy which decides 
what does happen.  Government health policy and needed reforms are subject to the 
whims and desires of powerful national and regional bureaucracies.  As long as Russia’s 
bureaucratic institutions remain relatively free from accountability to the people, it will 
retain its ability to serve itself rather than the public.266 
The institutional and ideological factors outlined in Chapter Two appear to be 
manifestations of Russia’s paternalistic political culture rather than primary contributors 
to the decline in health capital.  Additionally, the flood of energy revenues and rising 
incomes in Russia have done little to improve the overall level of health capital.  This 
appears to discount the argument that low incomes and inadequate financial resources 
were the primary cause of declining health capital. 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Slowing the decline of Russia’s health capital will be difficult over the short-term.  
To begin with, demographic trends do not change quickly.  The epidemiological and 
social factors pushing Russia’s health capital lower will require a multitude of 
adjustments throughout the political system and society.  In terms of government policy, 
changes must be made at two levels.  First, at the macro-level, the political culture of 
Russia must undergo a fundamental shift.  Second, at the micro-level, existing policies 
and programs must be adjusted to deal more effectively with current crises before they 
worsen. 
1. Macro-level Adjustments: Cultural Revolution 
The future of Russia’s health capital, in large part, is dependent on a shift from a 
political culture mired in a paternalistic past to one built on democratic principles and 
institutions.  A more democratically based political culture would provide both the state 
and the population with a greater incentive to solve the problems erasing the nation’s 
health capital.  Democracy would enhance the chances of improving Russia’s health 
capital by changing the relationship between the state and population.  The state would be 
accountable to the people and forced to address their concerns; the people would have a 
realistic chance of influencing government activity through their vote and other civic 
organizations.  Such a relationship would require the strengthening of democratic 
institutions.  The state must be subject to the rule of law.  Media must be free to 
guarantee that the actions of the government are transparent.  Society must be provided 
the economic means, i.e. private property and higher incomes, to leverage the state in 
their interest.267   
In order to transition Russia’s political culture away from its paternalistic roots 
and toward an acceptance of a democratic system, the “pervasive” and “universal 
cynicism” generated by state-society relations must be overcome.268  The Russian 
population must force the state to be accountable for its actions to a significant degree.  
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Previous and current attempts by the population to hold the state accountable have been 
ineffective and very limited in scope.  As Michael McFaul and Elina Treyger point out: 
Russian civil society is weak, atomized, apolitical, and heavily dependent 
on Western assistance for support.  It exerts little influence over state 
actions and policies and lacks the capacity to play a meaningful role in 
mediating state and individual interests, let alone resisting state 
encroachment on societal freedoms.269 
The question, therefore, is how the dominant political culture paternalism can be 
supplanted by the democratic political sub-culture.270   
Unfortunately, there is no easily identifiable answer outside of a considerable and 
concerted effort on the part of the Russian population to organize and act in their own 
interest.  They must come to realize the mounting costs of their collective political 
inactivity.  It is unlikely that Putin or his successor will willingly cede a significant 
degree of political control to the population without a struggle.  The time for the 
population to act, however, is now, with the world watching.  Change will become more 
difficult as the state continues to consolidate its power.   
Perhaps the best scenario would be for the population to unite behind one or two 
important issues and demand change and accountability from the government.  Success 
could create a powerful precedent and transform the future expectations of both the state 
and the population in regards to their relationship.  The crisis in public health and social 
welfare is a readily identifiable issue affecting the majority of the population, and which 
could be used as a platform to demand change and accountability from the state.  It is also 
an issue which the ruling elite may see as important to the economic viability of the 
country, thus increasing the likelihood that the state would acquiesce to the demands of 
the population.  Russia’s health capital stands to benefit from a shift toward the 
democratic political sub-culture. Once a larger portion of the Russian people realizes they 
can force the government to listen to them they will demand that their health issues be 
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addressed.  At the same time, once Russian state officials, both those elected and in the 
bureaucracy, realize that their political positions and authority are subject to the approval 
of the population, they will be compelled to find effective answers to the problems 
afflicting the country’s health capital.  
2. Micro-level Adjustments: Tweaking the Policy 
At the micro-level, a number of policy adjustments and changes could have 
immediate effects on Russia’s health capital.  First, existing programs which provide for 
and promote health must receive increased funding.  If the state is going to continue to 
assume direct responsibility for the provision of healthcare to the entire population, then 
it will need to supply the system with sufficient resources.  Currently, the Russian 
government is receiving significant revenues from the energy sector.  Budget surpluses 
are being deposited into a national stabilization fund, intended to moderate the economic 
effects of fluctuations in world energy prices.  (As of January 2007, the stabilization fund 
held over 2.3 trillion rubles or almost $99 billion.)271  A portion of these funds, however, 
could have long-term benefits for the Russian economy if used to fix the healthcare 
system and provide other important social benefits to the population.   
Greater coordination of healthcare policy and services at the national level also 
could improve the effectiveness of the system.  National planning would save resources 
by preventing the wasteful duplication of medical services.  Increased and consistent 
enforcement of national healthcare standards, even to a limited degree, could translate 
into better care for the patients.   Also, the state needs to continue to work closely with 
non-governmental and international health organizations on confronting the nation’s 
health problems.  Organizations, such as the World Health Organization, UNAIDS and 
the UN Development Program, offer Russia an increased degree of expertise and a good 
source for information and research outside the purview of the government.  Many of 
these organizations have experience and expertise in combating the health issues facing 
Russia today.  The majority of policy recommendations offered by these groups, if 
properly implemented, would have numerous positive consequences for Russia.  For the  
 
                                                 
271 Kommersant, “Stabilization Fund Added Trillion Rubles Past Year” (11 January 2007), at 
http://www.kommersant.com, accessed on 6 March 2007. 
84 
population, suffering would be reduced and a healthier future would be more likely.  The 
resulting increase in health capital could result in economic benefits for the entire 
country.272 
Finally, health and social education must be made available to the population.  
Aggressive efforts aimed at educating the public on the consequences of high-risk 
behaviors could reduce mortality and morbidity caused by alcohol consumption, tobacco 
use, drug use, unsafe sex, traffic accidents and diet.  Further, educational programs could 
teach the population positive and preventive health measures which would improve the 
quality of life and reduce the stress on the healthcare system.  There are several models of 
health education used throughout the developed world which could be adapted for use in 
Russian society.273   
C. CONCLUSION 
Changing the political culture in Russia likely will prove difficult.  Attempts at 
creating an active civil society, thus far, have met with limited success.  The Putin 
administration seems determined, at the present time, to avoid ceding any influence to 
such groups.  Circumstances today, however, are conducive to the eventual rise of 
Russia’s democratic political sub-culture.  The Russian population is no longer cut off 
from information about the rest of the world.  They understand how people elsewhere 
live and how different political systems operate.  While Russia’s attempt at democracy in 
the 1990s was scarred with gross inefficiencies and failures, it did expose the population 
to a free press and contested elections.  Hopefully, recent moves away from 
democratization will prove temporary.   
Change, however, must come soon.  The cost of fixing Russia’s health capital 
rises each day.  Russia’s future economic growth, ultimately, is as dependent on an 
adequate stock of health and human capital as it is on financial and physical capital.  
                                                 
272 A number of non-governmental organizations have issued reports with specific policy suggestions 
aimed at improving health in the Russian Federation.  See reports by The World Health Organization, The 
World Bank, and UNDP cited in this research. 
273 See The World Bank, Dying Too Young, 65-93 for a number of suggestions on how to reduce the 
prevalence of non-communicable diseases in Russian society.  The report strongly suggests the use of 
educational programs to combat the problem.  See also UNDP, Human Development Report 2005 Russian 
Federation, 94-107 for suggestions on combating HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.  This report 
also encourages the use of education in reducing the spread of infectious diseases. 
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Without enough health capital, it is likely the Russian economy eventually will suffer a 
devastating collapse.  Energy markets will not be able to sustain the Russian economy 
indefinitely.  The political, economic, and social instability resulting from a collapsed 
economy will have serious consequences not only for the Russian population but also for 
surrounding countries and the world at large. 
President Putin and his administration must realize that their aspiration for long-
term economic development will be impossible if the current crisis is not addressed 
properly and decisively.  Continued hedging by the government, in hopes that the 
problems simply will go away, only will cost the country more in the long run.  While the 
state may not be interested in the welfare of the population for humanitarian purposes, it 
should at least understand the economic importance of their well-being and act 
accordingly.  At the same time, the Russian population has been content to watch their 
health capital ebb away.  It is their living standard and life expectancy that are in decline.  
If they are not interested in protecting themselves, it is difficult to expect the government 
to do so.  While both the state and the population have a vested interest in the nation’s 
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